By Adnan Syed
A widely circulated ideology of Pakistan that is heavily promoted by the right wing section of the Pakistani society maintains that Pakistan was attained in the name of Islam for the Muslims of the Sub-Continent. Pakistan was created so that the social order can be created based on Islamic principles and people can live their life in accordance with their religious values. A variation of Nazaria Pakistan uses a popular slogan used by the Muslims during the 1946 elections: “Pakistan means there is no God except Allah”.
There is no doubt that the terms Islam and Muslims were used interchangeably by Muslim League in the elections of 1946, which were fought for Pakistan. However, Nazaria Pakistan (NP) while acknowledges a separate homeland for Muslims, it introduces Islam as a way of life that encompasses not just the private lives, but also the public affairs for the Muslims living within the geographical boundaries. Our founding fathers were aware of the distinction; the thorny discussion about the role of religion in the affairs of the state was alive among the ML leadership.
There have been instances when Quaid specifically mentioned that religion in the affairs of state was not acceptable. We see that even though Quaid did not come out explicitly in favour of one mode of state policy, Quaid was explicit in mentioning what Pakistan would not be: Theocracy (complete rule of religion into the affairs of the state) will not happen in Pakistan.
At the same time, we see Quaid invoking Islamic principles frequently in his speeches, even after the creation of Pakistan. While the vagueness regarding the role of Islam in the affairs of the state, maintained by Quaid in pre-Independence communal environment was tactically required, some may argue that Quaid unnecessarily kept up the vagueness post independence; a fact that has come back to haunt Pakistan again and again.
Since Quaid towered above every other leader in the Muslim League, most Pakistanis try to find the meaning of Pakistan in Quaid’s words. Many have pounced on the vaguness embedded in Quaid’s statement; General Zia-ul-Haq frequently used selective Quaid’s quotes to justify the complete Islamization of Pakistan during his dark decade of rule.
THE TWO NATION THEORY AND THE CONDITIONAL DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN:
Why would a state still be unsure of its exact identity of being a Muslim or an Islamic State? In a rather strange way, Pakistan was a conditional demand employed by Jinnah and Muslim League leadership. They wanted to ensure that Muslims have adequate representation and safeguards and Muslims would not fare poorly even when they made up 30% of the total population of the United India. “Brother Gandhi has three votes, Brother Jinnah has one vote” was one of Jinnah’s famous quips to pound on the fact that despite their sheer numbers, Muslims had no say in the affairs of the government of the United India.
The idea of Pakistan was based on single or multiple states with Muslim majority within the United India, and Quaid showed willingness as late as 1946 to accept Pakistan with United Punjab and Bengal within the Indian Federation boundaries.
Importantly, the Liaqat-Desai coalition in 1945, and the acceptance of Cabinet Mission in 1946 were clear indications that if demands of Muslim League about representation of Indian Muslims within United India were met, they were prepared to remain in the United India.
Pakistan was as much a consequence of Muslims struggles for their rights and self interest, as it was due to the attitude of the leaders of Congress. Viewing Jinnah with disdain and contempt, they called him out on his demand, and to their disdain, Pakistan became a reality.
So what was the raison-d’être of Pakistan? Was it just a result of cataclysmic politics of the early 20th century, a turbulent decade of 1940s as Britain had lost will to govern India after fighting a great World War, or a result of genuine Muslim disenfranchisement that was expressed as early as 1870s by Sir Syed and Ameer Ali?
Most certainly all of the above were the cases. Muslims as a distinct nation was an idea that started appearing at the dusk of Mughal Empire, and gained steam as Muslims started lagging behind their Hindu counterparts in the British India. The Two Nation Theory certainly explains the genesis of Pakistan quite well.
I would venture here that the concept of Muslim Nationalism for the creation of Pakistan completely suffices the reason behind the creation of Pakistan. However, separating Muslim identity from all encompassing Islamic influence was left unclear, and the ambiguity distorted the subsequent vision of Pakistan.
THE FREE USE OF ISLAM BY MUSLIM LEAGUE, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT MOVES TO PAKISTAN:
Importantly, the events after 1937 were moving at a breakneck speed. In a matter of 7 years, Pakistan turned from a visionary ideal to a geographical reality. During the time leading up to Pakistan creations, two important factors had started to influence the new state:
1) Muslim League frequently invoked Islam during the campaign leading to the creation of Pakistan. During the pivotal 1946 elections “Muslim League activists toured the countryside (and) personal commitment to Islam became fused with an assertion of Muslim community solidarity. As one election official reported ‘wherever I went everyone kept saying, bhai if we did not vote for the League, we would have become a kafir (infidel)’ “.[1]
While the distinction between a Muslim majority secular state and a Muslim majority Islamic state is a lot clearer today, for the 1940s Muslim, the distinction was not as cut and dry. A Muslim living in early 20th century was seeing the majority community prosper, and had genuine fears about being dominated by the majority Hindus, with whom Muslims developed at best an uneasy community relationship. The Muslim nationalism espoused by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was developing into a full blown movement, as Congress failed to realize the fear and power of the sizeable Muslim minority.
In that environment, Muslim League rode the public opinion when it gave voice to the Muslim fears. The two words “Islam” and “Muslims” were used interchangeably. From various statements of Quaid and Liaqat Ali Khan, we can establish that their idea of democratic Muslim state did not involve theocratic rule. Yet Islam was a necessary symbol, and the references to Muslim ideas were expressed freely in leadership rallies.
At the same time, the religious right in India was moving to Pakistan, and they were determined to purposefully use the words “Muslim” and “Islamic” together, exploit the logical consequence of mixing religion and nation together.
2) Islamic right wing parties under Jamaat-e-Islami, Majlis-e-Ahrar, and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind, who had vociferously opposed the Muslim League and their Pakistan platform before, started moving en-masse towards Pakistan. By all indications, around the time of partition, the religious right spearheaded by Abu-al-Ala-Moudoudi was weary of the secular credentials of Muslim League Leaders. Mr. Moudoudi, in his various writings was warning against the western disposition of Jinnah and his colleagues, and was rightly worried that the Muslim League leadership was looking for a democratic Pakistan, but not a Sharia ruled state. In several of Mr. Moudoudi’s writings, he wrote against Muslim League and the Quaid:
“Pity! From League’s Quaid-e-Azam down to the lower cadres, there is not a single person who has an Islamic outlook and thinking and whose perspective on matters is Islamic”
“To pronounce these people fit for leading Muslims for the simple reason that they are experts of Western type politics and masters of Western organizational arts, and are deeply in love with their people, is a manifestation of an Unislamic viewpoint and reflects ignorance of Islam”.
“Even with a microscopic study of their practical life, and their thinking, ideology, political behaviour and style of leadership, one can find not a trace of Islamic character.” [2]
Mr. Moudoudi equated “Muslim Nationalism” with chaste prostitution, and scoffed at the ideas of modern democratic Muslim state.
Before partition, Muslim League’s main rival was Indian National Congress. After partition, the religious right had started positioning itself as one of the bigger rivals. The fight for Pakistan entered new grounds when Quaid died too soon after the independence. From then onwards, we see a haphazard approach towards Islam by the state, leading us to the present times.
Historians Thomas and Barbara Metcalf caught the dilemma facing Pakistan in the following words: “Pakistan was a modern nation state for India’s Muslim population. At the same time, however, as a symbol of Muslim identity, Pakistan transcended the ordinary structures of the state. As such it evoked an ideal Islamic political order, in which the realization of Islamic life would be fused with the state’s ritual authority. This Pakistan would not be simply an arena in which politicians, even if Muslims pursued their every day disputes. During the bloody upheavals of 1946 and 1947, Pakistan underwent a transformation from visionary ideal to territorial state. Yet it could not, after independence, shake off the legacy of its origin as a ‘pure’ land at once of Muslims and of a confessional Islam”[3]
QUAID’S REFERENCES TO THE ROLE OF ISLAM:
Pakistan’s uneasy relationship with Islam had started to brew even when Pakistan was a demand, not a state. Pakistan as an Islamic state idea was advanced by a small faction inside Muslim League, whose most visible face was Raja of Mahmudabad. He formed Islami Jamaat cell within the Muslim League. Raja Sahib mentioned to Jinnah that since “Lahore Resolution was passed earlier in the year, and when Pakistan was formed it was undoubtedly to be an Islamic State with the Sunnah and Shariah as its bedrock. The Quaid’s face went red and he turned to ask Raja whether he had taken leave of his senses. Mr. Jinnah added: `Did you realize that there are over seventy sects and differences of opinion regarding the Islamic faith, and if what the Raja was suggesting was to be followed, the consequences would be a struggle of religious opinion from the very inception of the State leading to its very dissolution. Mr. Jinnah banged his hands on the table and said: We shall not be an Islamic State but a Liberal Democratic Muslim State.”[4]
Raja Sahib Mahmudabad ended up getting expelled from the Muslim League. His relationship with Quaid deteriorated to such an extent that he saw Quaid just once after the independence. In his last years “Quaid’s prodigal child” admitted that his “insistence on Pakistan being an Islamic state and taking recourse to violence” was wrong[5]. Yet his ideas in the early 1940s show signs of visible discomfort shown by the Muslim League leaders as they were freely mixing the terms of Islamic and Muslim state.
The above episode was one of many where Quaid was clear in one aspect; that Pakistan would not be a theocratic state. He clearly mentioned in his message to the people of the United States that “Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission”. [6]
Or the famous speech to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947 where he laid down what many perceive as his clearest and unequivocal message to the lawmakers of the newly formed country “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State…. You will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State”
To emphasize how shocking Quaid’s speech was for everyone in Pakistan, Maulana Shabbir Usmani immediately yet subtly condemned Quaid’s words. He reminded that if it was not for Islam (the unifying force), religious leaders would not have entered the freedom struggle, and no political party (including the Muslim League) would have been able to mobilize the masses. He called for declaring the new country an Islamic Republic. Other leaders were less guarded in their remarks. Jamaat Islami leader Ahsan Islahi called a Pakistan based on Quaid’s August 11 speech principles a devil’s creation[7]
Muslim League used the slogans of “Pakistan ka Matlab kiyaa, La Ilaha Illallah (Pakistan means There is no God except Allah)” and “Muslim hai to Muslim League main aa (If you are a Muslim then you should be in the Muslim League)” during the election campaigns. Yet, we do see a documented case where Quaid admonished a Muslim League worker for using the slogan of Pakistan means no God except God in Muslim League first post Pakistan meeting in Karachi. Quaid said that individuals may have used that slogan for garnering votes, but no such slogan was approved by the Muslim League’s central committee.[8]
Some of the clearest signals about the equality of the creeds was coveyed by Quaid’s actions as Governor General of Pakistan. He appointed J.N. Mandal as his first Law Minister. Setting up a scheduled caste Hindu to head the pivotal ministry of law was a clear sign that Quaid was looking for the laws of the state to rise above the creeds. Sir Zafarullah Khan was appointed the first Foreign Minister, despite protests from the religious right for belonging to the Ahmedi sect. It is well documented that Quaid asked for a Hindu poet Jagan Nath Azad to write the first national anthem of Pakistan. With his actions Quaid was showing that a Muslim majority Pakistan belonged equally to every sect and creed. “Minorities will cease to be minorities in the new state .. You may belong to any religion, caste or creed – this has nothing to do with the business of the state”. Isn’t that what he was saying, in words as well his actions?
As Dr. Ayesha Jalal said “Jinnah’s resort to religion was not an ideology to which he was ever committed or even a device to use against rival communities; it was simply a way of giving a semblance of unity and solidity to his divided Muslim constituents”[9]
However, at the same time we do see instances where Quaid included Islam with the state. And this is where the same right wing leaders who bitterly opposed Jinnah and his party, come to the forefront to make him nothing sort of a religious leader. For example, in the same speech to the people of the United States in February 1948 he described Pakistan as a “premier Islamic State”. In another instance, Jinnah called Khan Brothers’ claims untrue that “PCA (Pakistan Constituent Assembly) will disregard the fundamental principles of the Shariah and Quranic laws”.
There were instances when Jinnah replied to the question of democracy by saying that Muslims had learnt democracy thirteen centuries ago. There have been various references to Quran and Sunnah in Jinnah speeches as well.
His speech to the State Bank of Pakistan in July 1948 stated: “We must work our destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on true Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social justice. We will thereby be fulfilling our mission as Muslims and giving to humanity the message of peace which alone can save it and secure the welfare, happiness and prosperity of mankind”
THE BACKDROP OF A TUMULTOUS NEW BORN PAKISTAN:
What do we make of the conflicing statements from Quaid? Most likely, Quaid’s use of term “Islamic” was used in lieu of the Muslim democratic state. However, a glance at the tumultuous years preceding and following the creation of Pakistan do explain the choice of words on Quaid’s part.
Partition brought with its bloody communal rioting that left up to a million people dead. Majority of those killed were Muslims that were looking to move to their new homeland. The body count was huge and by every indication, consumed the new government’s efforts. The state was strapped for cash and fighting for its very survival against a much larger and supremely unhappy neighbour. Kashmir mess was beginning to brew into a major conflict, and any considerations to set aside religion from the affairs of the state was put aside for a while, as the state tended to more urgent needs.
By all indications, Quaid was under intense pressure during his last year due to the problems facing Pakistan. Pakistan seemed to be fighting for its own survival. We catch Quaid’s foreboding words in his speech in Lahore University on October 30, 1947.
“We are in the midst of unparalleled difficulties and untold sufferings; we have been through dark days of apprehension and anguish…We have been the victims of deeply-laid and well-planned conspiracy executed with utter disregard of the elementary principles of honesty, chivalry and honour…Do not be afraid of death, our religion teaches us to be always prepared for death. We should face it bravely to save the honour of Pakistan and Islam. There is no better salvation for a Muslim than the death of a martyr for a religious cause”[10]
In the extremely uncertain formative year of Pakistan, the state was beset with too much uncertainty and fear. The fight for Pakistan was invoked as fight for Islam. The Islamic concepts of martyrdom were used for Pakistani martyrs. We simply cannot fathom a months old republic facing so many threats as soon as it came into being. Quaid kept invoking Islam in his official speeches. For a Muslim majority new born state in 1940s, can we seriously blame Quaid for doing that? Half a million Muslims had died during the partition violence. The next door giant of a neighbor was waiting for Pakistan to collapse. The uneven standards were applied by India when it laid claim to Kashmir; over time it would annex Deccan and Junagadh, all on one pretext or another.
It is quite clear from his statements that Quaid sincerely wanted a democratic Muslim Republic that would be inspired by Islamic ideals, but would not promulgate Islam as a state religion. He did give us clear occasional references about his ideals of Pakistan based on secular, humanist principles. Unfortunately, we have to make do with his words that were both a product of catastrophic uncertainty for the new nation, as well as Quaid’s personal ideals. I would go one step further and say his statements are not as mutually contradictory ideals sixty years ago as they may seem right now. Quaid was invoking Muslim ideals to rally the majority Muslim nation under the banner of Pakistan. But constant message we hear from his words and actions is that he wanted Pakistan to be a Liberal Democratic Muslim State. I would get to this point in detail in the final conclusion, and would also say for now that sixty years have shown that our founding fathers’ well meaning idea of a democratic Liberal Muslim Republic seemed nice on paper, but is anything but practical in the real world.
Sixty years later, as the inexactness of religion within the state offices of Pakistan takes its toll on the nation, we wonder if Quaid needed to be more firm in publicly specifying the exact role of religion in the affairs of the state. He was rapidly dying of consumption mixed in with a deadly form of lung cancer. We do get plenty of his statements that imbue his vision of democratic progressive Pakistan. But apart from the important Constituent Assembly speech on August 11, 1947, we have to make do with his actions, his statements spread across various speeches and interviews and meetings with different leaders.
It is an undeniable fact that the Quaid had united the disparate group of the political union of the Indian Muslims under one banner of Muslim League. Despite clear references to exclusion of religion from the state (or at best laws were to be inspired by the religious lessons), Quaid never explicitly came out in putting his personal stamp on the exact role of religion. Since Quaid remained such a pivotal figure in Pakistan’s genesis, his death effectively left the whole country searching for its exact identity.
We learn from his biography by Stanley Wolpert that Quaid was obsessed with drafting of the new constitution of Pakistan in his last year. We can imagine had he lived up to the completion of the constitution, Pakistan would have achieved a much revered document outlining the exact place of religion in the affairs of the state. It was not to be; we see barely 6 months into his death, the leadership had set itself on a confused path that haunts us even today. One non Muslim member of Assembly remarked on the Objectives Resolution: “What I hear in this (Objectives) Resolution is not the voice of the great creator of Pakistan – the Quaid-i-Azam, nor even that of the Prime Minister of Pakistan the Honourable Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, but of the Ulema of the land”.
Saturday, October 17, 2009
The Undefined Equilibrium between Pakistan and Islam. Part 2: Our Founding Father’s Vision
By Adnan Syed
A widely circulated ideology of Pakistan that is heavily promoted by the right wing section of the Pakistani society maintains that Pakistan was attained in the name of Islam for the Muslims of the Sub-Continent. Pakistan was created so that the social order can be created based on Islamic principles and people can live their life in accordance with their religious values. A variation of Nazaria Pakistan uses a popular slogan used by the Muslims during the 1946 elections: “Pakistan means there is no God except Allah”.
There is no doubt that the terms Islam and Muslims were used interchangeably by Muslim League in the elections of 1946, which were fought for Pakistan. However, Nazaria Pakistan (NP) while acknowledges a separate homeland for Muslims, it introduces Islam as a way of life that encompasses not just the private lives, but also the public affairs for the Muslims living within the geographical boundaries. Our founding fathers were aware of the distinction; the thorny discussion about the role of religion in the affairs of the state was alive among the ML leadership.
There have been instances when Quaid specifically mentioned that religion in the affairs of state was not acceptable. We see that even though Quaid did not come out explicitly in favour of one mode of state policy, Quaid was explicit in mentioning what Pakistan would not be: Theocracy (complete rule of religion into the affairs of the state) will not happen in Pakistan.
At the same time, we see Quaid invoking Islamic principles frequently in his speeches, even after the creation of Pakistan. While the vagueness regarding the role of Islam in the affairs of the state, maintained by Quaid in pre-Independence communal environment was tactically required, some may argue that Quaid unnecessarily kept up the vagueness post independence; a fact that has come back to haunt Pakistan again and again.
Since Quaid towered above every other leader in the Muslim League, most Pakistanis try to find the meaning of Pakistan in Quaid’s words. Many have pounced on the vaguness embedded in Quaid’s statement; General Zia-ul-Haq frequently used selective Quaid’s quotes to justify the complete Islamization of Pakistan during his dark decade of rule.
THE TWO NATION THEORY AND THE CONDITIONAL DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN:
Why would a state still be unsure of its exact identity of being a Muslim or an Islamic State? In a rather strange way, Pakistan was a conditional demand employed by Jinnah and Muslim League leadership. They wanted to ensure that Muslims have adequate representation and safeguards and Muslims would not fare poorly even when they made up 30% of the total population of the United India. “Brother Gandhi has three votes, Brother Jinnah has one vote” was one of Jinnah’s famous quips to pound on the fact that despite their sheer numbers, Muslims had no say in the affairs of the government of the United India.
The idea of Pakistan was based on single or multiple states with Muslim majority within the United India, and Quaid showed willingness as late as 1946 to accept Pakistan with United Punjab and Bengal within the Indian Federation boundaries.
Importantly, the Liaqat-Desai coalition in 1945, and the acceptance of Cabinet Mission in 1946 were clear indications that if demands of Muslim League about representation of Indian Muslims within United India were met, they were prepared to remain in the United India.
Pakistan was as much a consequence of Muslims struggles for their rights and self interest, as it was due to the attitude of the leaders of Congress. Viewing Jinnah with disdain and contempt, they called him out on his demand, and to their disdain, Pakistan became a reality.
So what was the raison-d’être of Pakistan? Was it just a result of cataclysmic politics of the early 20th century, a turbulent decade of 1940s as Britain had lost will to govern India after fighting a great World War, or a result of genuine Muslim disenfranchisement that was expressed as early as 1870s by Sir Syed and Ameer Ali?
Most certainly all of the above were the cases. Muslims as a distinct nation was an idea that started appearing at the dusk of Mughal Empire, and gained steam as Muslims started lagging behind their Hindu counterparts in the British India. The Two Nation Theory certainly explains the genesis of Pakistan quite well.
I would venture here that the concept of Muslim Nationalism for the creation of Pakistan completely suffices the reason behind the creation of Pakistan. However, separating Muslim identity from all encompassing Islamic influence was left unclear, and the ambiguity distorted the subsequent vision of Pakistan.
THE FREE USE OF ISLAM BY MUSLIM LEAGUE, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT MOVES TO PAKISTAN:
Importantly, the events after 1937 were moving at a breakneck speed. In a matter of 7 years, Pakistan turned from a visionary ideal to a geographical reality. During the time leading up to Pakistan creations, two important factors had started to influence the new state:
1) Muslim League frequently invoked Islam during the campaign leading to the creation of Pakistan. During the pivotal 1946 elections “Muslim League activists toured the countryside (and) personal commitment to Islam became fused with an assertion of Muslim community solidarity. As one election official reported ‘wherever I went everyone kept saying, bhai if we did not vote for the League, we would have become a kafir (infidel)’ “.[1]
While the distinction between a Muslim majority secular state and a Muslim majority Islamic state is a lot clearer today, for the 1940s Muslim, the distinction was not as cut and dry. A Muslim living in early 20th century was seeing the majority community prosper, and had genuine fears about being dominated by the majority Hindus, with whom Muslims developed at best an uneasy community relationship. The Muslim nationalism espoused by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was developing into a full blown movement, as Congress failed to realize the fear and power of the sizeable Muslim minority.
In that environment, Muslim League rode the public opinion when it gave voice to the Muslim fears. The two words “Islam” and “Muslims” were used interchangeably. From various statements of Quaid and Liaqat Ali Khan, we can establish that their idea of democratic Muslim state did not involve theocratic rule. Yet Islam was a necessary symbol, and the references to Muslim ideas were expressed freely in leadership rallies.
At the same time, the religious right in India was moving to Pakistan, and they were determined to purposefully use the words “Muslim” and “Islamic” together, exploit the logical consequence of mixing religion and nation together.
2) Islamic right wing parties under Jamaat-e-Islami, Majlis-e-Ahrar, and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind, who had vociferously opposed the Muslim League and their Pakistan platform before, started moving en-masse towards Pakistan. By all indications, around the time of partition, the religious right spearheaded by Abu-al-Ala-Moudoudi was weary of the secular credentials of Muslim League Leaders. Mr. Moudoudi, in his various writings was warning against the western disposition of Jinnah and his colleagues, and was rightly worried that the Muslim League leadership was looking for a democratic Pakistan, but not a Sharia ruled state. In several of Mr. Moudoudi’s writings, he wrote against Muslim League and the Quaid:
“Pity! From League’s Quaid-e-Azam down to the lower cadres, there is not a single person who has an Islamic outlook and thinking and whose perspective on matters is Islamic”
“To pronounce these people fit for leading Muslims for the simple reason that they are experts of Western type politics and masters of Western organizational arts, and are deeply in love with their people, is a manifestation of an Unislamic viewpoint and reflects ignorance of Islam”.
“Even with a microscopic study of their practical life, and their thinking, ideology, political behaviour and style of leadership, one can find not a trace of Islamic character.” [2]
Mr. Moudoudi equated “Muslim Nationalism” with chaste prostitution, and scoffed at the ideas of modern democratic Muslim state.
Before partition, Muslim League’s main rival was Indian National Congress. After partition, the religious right had started positioning itself as one of the bigger rivals. The fight for Pakistan entered new grounds when Quaid died too soon after the independence. From then onwards, we see a haphazard approach towards Islam by the state, leading us to the present times.
Historians Thomas and Barbara Metcalf caught the dilemma facing Pakistan in the following words: “Pakistan was a modern nation state for India’s Muslim population. At the same time, however, as a symbol of Muslim identity, Pakistan transcended the ordinary structures of the state. As such it evoked an ideal Islamic political order, in which the realization of Islamic life would be fused with the state’s ritual authority. This Pakistan would not be simply an arena in which politicians, even if Muslims pursued their every day disputes. During the bloody upheavals of 1946 and 1947, Pakistan underwent a transformation from visionary ideal to territorial state. Yet it could not, after independence, shake off the legacy of its origin as a ‘pure’ land at once of Muslims and of a confessional Islam”[3]
QUAID’S REFERENCES TO THE ROLE OF ISLAM:
Pakistan’s uneasy relationship with Islam had started to brew even when Pakistan was a demand, not a state. Pakistan as an Islamic state idea was advanced by a small faction inside Muslim League, whose most visible face was Raja of Mahmudabad. He formed Islami Jamaat cell within the Muslim League. Raja Sahib mentioned to Jinnah that since “Lahore Resolution was passed earlier in the year, and when Pakistan was formed it was undoubtedly to be an Islamic State with the Sunnah and Shariah as its bedrock. The Quaid’s face went red and he turned to ask Raja whether he had taken leave of his senses. Mr. Jinnah added: `Did you realize that there are over seventy sects and differences of opinion regarding the Islamic faith, and if what the Raja was suggesting was to be followed, the consequences would be a struggle of religious opinion from the very inception of the State leading to its very dissolution. Mr. Jinnah banged his hands on the table and said: We shall not be an Islamic State but a Liberal Democratic Muslim State.”[4]
Raja Sahib Mahmudabad ended up getting expelled from the Muslim League. His relationship with Quaid deteriorated to such an extent that he saw Quaid just once after the independence. In his last years “Quaid’s prodigal child” admitted that his “insistence on Pakistan being an Islamic state and taking recourse to violence” was wrong[5]. Yet his ideas in the early 1940s show signs of visible discomfort shown by the Muslim League leaders as they were freely mixing the terms of Islamic and Muslim state.
The above episode was one of many where Quaid was clear in one aspect; that Pakistan would not be a theocratic state. He clearly mentioned in his message to the people of the United States that “Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission”. [6]
Or the famous speech to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947 where he laid down what many perceive as his clearest and unequivocal message to the lawmakers of the newly formed country “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State…. You will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State”
To emphasize how shocking Quaid’s speech was for everyone in Pakistan, Maulana Shabbir Usmani immediately yet subtly condemned Quaid’s words. He reminded that if it was not for Islam (the unifying force), religious leaders would not have entered the freedom struggle, and no political party (including the Muslim League) would have been able to mobilize the masses. He called for declaring the new country an Islamic Republic. Other leaders were less guarded in their remarks. Jamaat Islami leader Ahsan Islahi called a Pakistan based on Quaid’s August 11 speech principles a devil’s creation[7]
Muslim League used the slogans of “Pakistan ka Matlab kiyaa, La Ilaha Illallah (Pakistan means There is no God except Allah)” and “Muslim hai to Muslim League main aa (If you are a Muslim then you should be in the Muslim League)” during the election campaigns. Yet, we do see a documented case where Quaid admonished a Muslim League worker for using the slogan of Pakistan means no God except God in Muslim League first post Pakistan meeting in Karachi. Quaid said that individuals may have used that slogan for garnering votes, but no such slogan was approved by the Muslim League’s central committee.[8]
Some of the clearest signals about the equality of the creeds was coveyed by Quaid’s actions as Governor General of Pakistan. He appointed J.N. Mandal as his first Law Minister. Setting up a scheduled caste Hindu to head the pivotal ministry of law was a clear sign that Quaid was looking for the laws of the state to rise above the creeds. Sir Zafarullah Khan was appointed the first Foreign Minister, despite protests from the religious right for belonging to the Ahmedi sect. It is well documented that Quaid asked for a Hindu poet Jagan Nath Azad to write the first national anthem of Pakistan. With his actions Quaid was showing that a Muslim majority Pakistan belonged equally to every sect and creed. “Minorities will cease to be minorities in the new state .. You may belong to any religion, caste or creed – this has nothing to do with the business of the state”. Isn’t that what he was saying, in words as well his actions?
As Dr. Ayesha Jalal said “Jinnah’s resort to religion was not an ideology to which he was ever committed or even a device to use against rival communities; it was simply a way of giving a semblance of unity and solidity to his divided Muslim constituents”[9]
However, at the same time we do see instances where Quaid included Islam with the state. And this is where the same right wing leaders who bitterly opposed Jinnah and his party, come to the forefront to make him nothing sort of a religious leader. For example, in the same speech to the people of the United States in February 1948 he described Pakistan as a “premier Islamic State”. In another instance, Jinnah called Khan Brothers’ claims untrue that “PCA (Pakistan Constituent Assembly) will disregard the fundamental principles of the Shariah and Quranic laws”.
There were instances when Jinnah replied to the question of democracy by saying that Muslims had learnt democracy thirteen centuries ago. There have been various references to Quran and Sunnah in Jinnah speeches as well.
His speech to the State Bank of Pakistan in July 1948 stated: “We must work our destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on true Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social justice. We will thereby be fulfilling our mission as Muslims and giving to humanity the message of peace which alone can save it and secure the welfare, happiness and prosperity of mankind”
THE BACKDROP OF A TUMULTOUS NEW BORN PAKISTAN:
What do we make of the conflicing statements from Quaid? Most likely, Quaid’s use of term “Islamic” was used in lieu of the Muslim democratic state. However, a glance at the tumultuous years preceding and following the creation of Pakistan do explain the choice of words on Quaid’s part.
Partition brought with its bloody communal rioting that left up to a million people dead. Majority of those killed were Muslims that were looking to move to their new homeland. The body count was huge and by every indication, consumed the new government’s efforts. The state was strapped for cash and fighting for its very survival against a much larger and supremely unhappy neighbour. Kashmir mess was beginning to brew into a major conflict, and any considerations to set aside religion from the affairs of the state was put aside for a while, as the state tended to more urgent needs.
By all indications, Quaid was under intense pressure during his last year due to the problems facing Pakistan. Pakistan seemed to be fighting for its own survival. We catch Quaid’s foreboding words in his speech in Lahore University on October 30, 1947.
“We are in the midst of unparalleled difficulties and untold sufferings; we have been through dark days of apprehension and anguish…We have been the victims of deeply-laid and well-planned conspiracy executed with utter disregard of the elementary principles of honesty, chivalry and honour…Do not be afraid of death, our religion teaches us to be always prepared for death. We should face it bravely to save the honour of Pakistan and Islam. There is no better salvation for a Muslim than the death of a martyr for a religious cause”[10]
In the extremely uncertain formative year of Pakistan, the state was beset with too much uncertainty and fear. The fight for Pakistan was invoked as fight for Islam. The Islamic concepts of martyrdom were used for Pakistani martyrs. We simply cannot fathom a months old republic facing so many threats as soon as it came into being. Quaid kept invoking Islam in his official speeches. For a Muslim majority new born state in 1940s, can we seriously blame Quaid for doing that? Half a million Muslims had died during the partition violence. The next door giant of a neighbor was waiting for Pakistan to collapse. The uneven standards were applied by India when it laid claim to Kashmir; over time it would annex Deccan and Junagadh, all on one pretext or another.
It is quite clear from his statements that Quaid sincerely wanted a democratic Muslim Republic that would be inspired by Islamic ideals, but would not promulgate Islam as a state religion. He did give us clear occasional references about his ideals of Pakistan based on secular, humanist principles. Unfortunately, we have to make do with his words that were both a product of catastrophic uncertainty for the new nation, as well as Quaid’s personal ideals. I would go one step further and say his statements are not as mutually contradictory ideals sixty years ago as they may seem right now. Quaid was invoking Muslim ideals to rally the majority Muslim nation under the banner of Pakistan. But constant message we hear from his words and actions is that he wanted Pakistan to be a Liberal Democratic Muslim State. I would get to this point in detail in the final conclusion, and would also say for now that sixty years have shown that our founding fathers’ well meaning idea of a democratic Liberal Muslim Republic seemed nice on paper, but is anything but practical in the real world.
Sixty years later, as the inexactness of religion within the state offices of Pakistan takes its toll on the nation, we wonder if Quaid needed to be more firm in publicly specifying the exact role of religion in the affairs of the state. He was rapidly dying of consumption mixed in with a deadly form of lung cancer. We do get plenty of his statements that imbue his vision of democratic progressive Pakistan. But apart from the important Constituent Assembly speech on August 11, 1947, we have to make do with his actions, his statements spread across various speeches and interviews and meetings with different leaders.
It is an undeniable fact that the Quaid had united the disparate group of the political union of the Indian Muslims under one banner of Muslim League. Despite clear references to exclusion of religion from the state (or at best laws were to be inspired by the religious lessons), Quaid never explicitly came out in putting his personal stamp on the exact role of religion. Since Quaid remained such a pivotal figure in Pakistan’s genesis, his death effectively left the whole country searching for its exact identity.
We learn from his biography by Stanley Wolpert that Quaid was obsessed with drafting of the new constitution of Pakistan in his last year. We can imagine had he lived up to the completion of the constitution, Pakistan would have achieved a much revered document outlining the exact place of religion in the affairs of the state. It was not to be; we see barely 6 months into his death, the leadership had set itself on a confused path that haunts us even today. One non Muslim member of Assembly remarked on the Objectives Resolution: “What I hear in this (Objectives) Resolution is not the voice of the great creator of Pakistan – the Quaid-i-Azam, nor even that of the Prime Minister of Pakistan the Honourable Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, but of the Ulema of the land”.
A widely circulated ideology of Pakistan that is heavily promoted by the right wing section of the Pakistani society maintains that Pakistan was attained in the name of Islam for the Muslims of the Sub-Continent. Pakistan was created so that the social order can be created based on Islamic principles and people can live their life in accordance with their religious values. A variation of Nazaria Pakistan uses a popular slogan used by the Muslims during the 1946 elections: “Pakistan means there is no God except Allah”.
There is no doubt that the terms Islam and Muslims were used interchangeably by Muslim League in the elections of 1946, which were fought for Pakistan. However, Nazaria Pakistan (NP) while acknowledges a separate homeland for Muslims, it introduces Islam as a way of life that encompasses not just the private lives, but also the public affairs for the Muslims living within the geographical boundaries. Our founding fathers were aware of the distinction; the thorny discussion about the role of religion in the affairs of the state was alive among the ML leadership.
There have been instances when Quaid specifically mentioned that religion in the affairs of state was not acceptable. We see that even though Quaid did not come out explicitly in favour of one mode of state policy, Quaid was explicit in mentioning what Pakistan would not be: Theocracy (complete rule of religion into the affairs of the state) will not happen in Pakistan.
At the same time, we see Quaid invoking Islamic principles frequently in his speeches, even after the creation of Pakistan. While the vagueness regarding the role of Islam in the affairs of the state, maintained by Quaid in pre-Independence communal environment was tactically required, some may argue that Quaid unnecessarily kept up the vagueness post independence; a fact that has come back to haunt Pakistan again and again.
Since Quaid towered above every other leader in the Muslim League, most Pakistanis try to find the meaning of Pakistan in Quaid’s words. Many have pounced on the vaguness embedded in Quaid’s statement; General Zia-ul-Haq frequently used selective Quaid’s quotes to justify the complete Islamization of Pakistan during his dark decade of rule.
THE TWO NATION THEORY AND THE CONDITIONAL DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN:
Why would a state still be unsure of its exact identity of being a Muslim or an Islamic State? In a rather strange way, Pakistan was a conditional demand employed by Jinnah and Muslim League leadership. They wanted to ensure that Muslims have adequate representation and safeguards and Muslims would not fare poorly even when they made up 30% of the total population of the United India. “Brother Gandhi has three votes, Brother Jinnah has one vote” was one of Jinnah’s famous quips to pound on the fact that despite their sheer numbers, Muslims had no say in the affairs of the government of the United India.
The idea of Pakistan was based on single or multiple states with Muslim majority within the United India, and Quaid showed willingness as late as 1946 to accept Pakistan with United Punjab and Bengal within the Indian Federation boundaries.
Importantly, the Liaqat-Desai coalition in 1945, and the acceptance of Cabinet Mission in 1946 were clear indications that if demands of Muslim League about representation of Indian Muslims within United India were met, they were prepared to remain in the United India.
Pakistan was as much a consequence of Muslims struggles for their rights and self interest, as it was due to the attitude of the leaders of Congress. Viewing Jinnah with disdain and contempt, they called him out on his demand, and to their disdain, Pakistan became a reality.
So what was the raison-d’être of Pakistan? Was it just a result of cataclysmic politics of the early 20th century, a turbulent decade of 1940s as Britain had lost will to govern India after fighting a great World War, or a result of genuine Muslim disenfranchisement that was expressed as early as 1870s by Sir Syed and Ameer Ali?
Most certainly all of the above were the cases. Muslims as a distinct nation was an idea that started appearing at the dusk of Mughal Empire, and gained steam as Muslims started lagging behind their Hindu counterparts in the British India. The Two Nation Theory certainly explains the genesis of Pakistan quite well.
I would venture here that the concept of Muslim Nationalism for the creation of Pakistan completely suffices the reason behind the creation of Pakistan. However, separating Muslim identity from all encompassing Islamic influence was left unclear, and the ambiguity distorted the subsequent vision of Pakistan.
THE FREE USE OF ISLAM BY MUSLIM LEAGUE, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT MOVES TO PAKISTAN:
Importantly, the events after 1937 were moving at a breakneck speed. In a matter of 7 years, Pakistan turned from a visionary ideal to a geographical reality. During the time leading up to Pakistan creations, two important factors had started to influence the new state:
1) Muslim League frequently invoked Islam during the campaign leading to the creation of Pakistan. During the pivotal 1946 elections “Muslim League activists toured the countryside (and) personal commitment to Islam became fused with an assertion of Muslim community solidarity. As one election official reported ‘wherever I went everyone kept saying, bhai if we did not vote for the League, we would have become a kafir (infidel)’ “.[1]
While the distinction between a Muslim majority secular state and a Muslim majority Islamic state is a lot clearer today, for the 1940s Muslim, the distinction was not as cut and dry. A Muslim living in early 20th century was seeing the majority community prosper, and had genuine fears about being dominated by the majority Hindus, with whom Muslims developed at best an uneasy community relationship. The Muslim nationalism espoused by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was developing into a full blown movement, as Congress failed to realize the fear and power of the sizeable Muslim minority.
In that environment, Muslim League rode the public opinion when it gave voice to the Muslim fears. The two words “Islam” and “Muslims” were used interchangeably. From various statements of Quaid and Liaqat Ali Khan, we can establish that their idea of democratic Muslim state did not involve theocratic rule. Yet Islam was a necessary symbol, and the references to Muslim ideas were expressed freely in leadership rallies.
At the same time, the religious right in India was moving to Pakistan, and they were determined to purposefully use the words “Muslim” and “Islamic” together, exploit the logical consequence of mixing religion and nation together.
2) Islamic right wing parties under Jamaat-e-Islami, Majlis-e-Ahrar, and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind, who had vociferously opposed the Muslim League and their Pakistan platform before, started moving en-masse towards Pakistan. By all indications, around the time of partition, the religious right spearheaded by Abu-al-Ala-Moudoudi was weary of the secular credentials of Muslim League Leaders. Mr. Moudoudi, in his various writings was warning against the western disposition of Jinnah and his colleagues, and was rightly worried that the Muslim League leadership was looking for a democratic Pakistan, but not a Sharia ruled state. In several of Mr. Moudoudi’s writings, he wrote against Muslim League and the Quaid:
“Pity! From League’s Quaid-e-Azam down to the lower cadres, there is not a single person who has an Islamic outlook and thinking and whose perspective on matters is Islamic”
“To pronounce these people fit for leading Muslims for the simple reason that they are experts of Western type politics and masters of Western organizational arts, and are deeply in love with their people, is a manifestation of an Unislamic viewpoint and reflects ignorance of Islam”.
“Even with a microscopic study of their practical life, and their thinking, ideology, political behaviour and style of leadership, one can find not a trace of Islamic character.” [2]
Mr. Moudoudi equated “Muslim Nationalism” with chaste prostitution, and scoffed at the ideas of modern democratic Muslim state.
Before partition, Muslim League’s main rival was Indian National Congress. After partition, the religious right had started positioning itself as one of the bigger rivals. The fight for Pakistan entered new grounds when Quaid died too soon after the independence. From then onwards, we see a haphazard approach towards Islam by the state, leading us to the present times.
Historians Thomas and Barbara Metcalf caught the dilemma facing Pakistan in the following words: “Pakistan was a modern nation state for India’s Muslim population. At the same time, however, as a symbol of Muslim identity, Pakistan transcended the ordinary structures of the state. As such it evoked an ideal Islamic political order, in which the realization of Islamic life would be fused with the state’s ritual authority. This Pakistan would not be simply an arena in which politicians, even if Muslims pursued their every day disputes. During the bloody upheavals of 1946 and 1947, Pakistan underwent a transformation from visionary ideal to territorial state. Yet it could not, after independence, shake off the legacy of its origin as a ‘pure’ land at once of Muslims and of a confessional Islam”[3]
QUAID’S REFERENCES TO THE ROLE OF ISLAM:
Pakistan’s uneasy relationship with Islam had started to brew even when Pakistan was a demand, not a state. Pakistan as an Islamic state idea was advanced by a small faction inside Muslim League, whose most visible face was Raja of Mahmudabad. He formed Islami Jamaat cell within the Muslim League. Raja Sahib mentioned to Jinnah that since “Lahore Resolution was passed earlier in the year, and when Pakistan was formed it was undoubtedly to be an Islamic State with the Sunnah and Shariah as its bedrock. The Quaid’s face went red and he turned to ask Raja whether he had taken leave of his senses. Mr. Jinnah added: `Did you realize that there are over seventy sects and differences of opinion regarding the Islamic faith, and if what the Raja was suggesting was to be followed, the consequences would be a struggle of religious opinion from the very inception of the State leading to its very dissolution. Mr. Jinnah banged his hands on the table and said: We shall not be an Islamic State but a Liberal Democratic Muslim State.”[4]
Raja Sahib Mahmudabad ended up getting expelled from the Muslim League. His relationship with Quaid deteriorated to such an extent that he saw Quaid just once after the independence. In his last years “Quaid’s prodigal child” admitted that his “insistence on Pakistan being an Islamic state and taking recourse to violence” was wrong[5]. Yet his ideas in the early 1940s show signs of visible discomfort shown by the Muslim League leaders as they were freely mixing the terms of Islamic and Muslim state.
The above episode was one of many where Quaid was clear in one aspect; that Pakistan would not be a theocratic state. He clearly mentioned in his message to the people of the United States that “Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission”. [6]
Or the famous speech to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947 where he laid down what many perceive as his clearest and unequivocal message to the lawmakers of the newly formed country “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State…. You will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State”
To emphasize how shocking Quaid’s speech was for everyone in Pakistan, Maulana Shabbir Usmani immediately yet subtly condemned Quaid’s words. He reminded that if it was not for Islam (the unifying force), religious leaders would not have entered the freedom struggle, and no political party (including the Muslim League) would have been able to mobilize the masses. He called for declaring the new country an Islamic Republic. Other leaders were less guarded in their remarks. Jamaat Islami leader Ahsan Islahi called a Pakistan based on Quaid’s August 11 speech principles a devil’s creation[7]
Muslim League used the slogans of “Pakistan ka Matlab kiyaa, La Ilaha Illallah (Pakistan means There is no God except Allah)” and “Muslim hai to Muslim League main aa (If you are a Muslim then you should be in the Muslim League)” during the election campaigns. Yet, we do see a documented case where Quaid admonished a Muslim League worker for using the slogan of Pakistan means no God except God in Muslim League first post Pakistan meeting in Karachi. Quaid said that individuals may have used that slogan for garnering votes, but no such slogan was approved by the Muslim League’s central committee.[8]
Some of the clearest signals about the equality of the creeds was coveyed by Quaid’s actions as Governor General of Pakistan. He appointed J.N. Mandal as his first Law Minister. Setting up a scheduled caste Hindu to head the pivotal ministry of law was a clear sign that Quaid was looking for the laws of the state to rise above the creeds. Sir Zafarullah Khan was appointed the first Foreign Minister, despite protests from the religious right for belonging to the Ahmedi sect. It is well documented that Quaid asked for a Hindu poet Jagan Nath Azad to write the first national anthem of Pakistan. With his actions Quaid was showing that a Muslim majority Pakistan belonged equally to every sect and creed. “Minorities will cease to be minorities in the new state .. You may belong to any religion, caste or creed – this has nothing to do with the business of the state”. Isn’t that what he was saying, in words as well his actions?
As Dr. Ayesha Jalal said “Jinnah’s resort to religion was not an ideology to which he was ever committed or even a device to use against rival communities; it was simply a way of giving a semblance of unity and solidity to his divided Muslim constituents”[9]
However, at the same time we do see instances where Quaid included Islam with the state. And this is where the same right wing leaders who bitterly opposed Jinnah and his party, come to the forefront to make him nothing sort of a religious leader. For example, in the same speech to the people of the United States in February 1948 he described Pakistan as a “premier Islamic State”. In another instance, Jinnah called Khan Brothers’ claims untrue that “PCA (Pakistan Constituent Assembly) will disregard the fundamental principles of the Shariah and Quranic laws”.
There were instances when Jinnah replied to the question of democracy by saying that Muslims had learnt democracy thirteen centuries ago. There have been various references to Quran and Sunnah in Jinnah speeches as well.
His speech to the State Bank of Pakistan in July 1948 stated: “We must work our destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on true Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social justice. We will thereby be fulfilling our mission as Muslims and giving to humanity the message of peace which alone can save it and secure the welfare, happiness and prosperity of mankind”
THE BACKDROP OF A TUMULTOUS NEW BORN PAKISTAN:
What do we make of the conflicing statements from Quaid? Most likely, Quaid’s use of term “Islamic” was used in lieu of the Muslim democratic state. However, a glance at the tumultuous years preceding and following the creation of Pakistan do explain the choice of words on Quaid’s part.
Partition brought with its bloody communal rioting that left up to a million people dead. Majority of those killed were Muslims that were looking to move to their new homeland. The body count was huge and by every indication, consumed the new government’s efforts. The state was strapped for cash and fighting for its very survival against a much larger and supremely unhappy neighbour. Kashmir mess was beginning to brew into a major conflict, and any considerations to set aside religion from the affairs of the state was put aside for a while, as the state tended to more urgent needs.
By all indications, Quaid was under intense pressure during his last year due to the problems facing Pakistan. Pakistan seemed to be fighting for its own survival. We catch Quaid’s foreboding words in his speech in Lahore University on October 30, 1947.
“We are in the midst of unparalleled difficulties and untold sufferings; we have been through dark days of apprehension and anguish…We have been the victims of deeply-laid and well-planned conspiracy executed with utter disregard of the elementary principles of honesty, chivalry and honour…Do not be afraid of death, our religion teaches us to be always prepared for death. We should face it bravely to save the honour of Pakistan and Islam. There is no better salvation for a Muslim than the death of a martyr for a religious cause”[10]
In the extremely uncertain formative year of Pakistan, the state was beset with too much uncertainty and fear. The fight for Pakistan was invoked as fight for Islam. The Islamic concepts of martyrdom were used for Pakistani martyrs. We simply cannot fathom a months old republic facing so many threats as soon as it came into being. Quaid kept invoking Islam in his official speeches. For a Muslim majority new born state in 1940s, can we seriously blame Quaid for doing that? Half a million Muslims had died during the partition violence. The next door giant of a neighbor was waiting for Pakistan to collapse. The uneven standards were applied by India when it laid claim to Kashmir; over time it would annex Deccan and Junagadh, all on one pretext or another.
It is quite clear from his statements that Quaid sincerely wanted a democratic Muslim Republic that would be inspired by Islamic ideals, but would not promulgate Islam as a state religion. He did give us clear occasional references about his ideals of Pakistan based on secular, humanist principles. Unfortunately, we have to make do with his words that were both a product of catastrophic uncertainty for the new nation, as well as Quaid’s personal ideals. I would go one step further and say his statements are not as mutually contradictory ideals sixty years ago as they may seem right now. Quaid was invoking Muslim ideals to rally the majority Muslim nation under the banner of Pakistan. But constant message we hear from his words and actions is that he wanted Pakistan to be a Liberal Democratic Muslim State. I would get to this point in detail in the final conclusion, and would also say for now that sixty years have shown that our founding fathers’ well meaning idea of a democratic Liberal Muslim Republic seemed nice on paper, but is anything but practical in the real world.
Sixty years later, as the inexactness of religion within the state offices of Pakistan takes its toll on the nation, we wonder if Quaid needed to be more firm in publicly specifying the exact role of religion in the affairs of the state. He was rapidly dying of consumption mixed in with a deadly form of lung cancer. We do get plenty of his statements that imbue his vision of democratic progressive Pakistan. But apart from the important Constituent Assembly speech on August 11, 1947, we have to make do with his actions, his statements spread across various speeches and interviews and meetings with different leaders.
It is an undeniable fact that the Quaid had united the disparate group of the political union of the Indian Muslims under one banner of Muslim League. Despite clear references to exclusion of religion from the state (or at best laws were to be inspired by the religious lessons), Quaid never explicitly came out in putting his personal stamp on the exact role of religion. Since Quaid remained such a pivotal figure in Pakistan’s genesis, his death effectively left the whole country searching for its exact identity.
We learn from his biography by Stanley Wolpert that Quaid was obsessed with drafting of the new constitution of Pakistan in his last year. We can imagine had he lived up to the completion of the constitution, Pakistan would have achieved a much revered document outlining the exact place of religion in the affairs of the state. It was not to be; we see barely 6 months into his death, the leadership had set itself on a confused path that haunts us even today. One non Muslim member of Assembly remarked on the Objectives Resolution: “What I hear in this (Objectives) Resolution is not the voice of the great creator of Pakistan – the Quaid-i-Azam, nor even that of the Prime Minister of Pakistan the Honourable Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, but of the Ulema of the land”.
The Undefined Equilibrium between Pakistan and Islam. Part 2: Our Founding Father’s Vision
By Adnan Syed
A widely circulated ideology of Pakistan that is heavily promoted by the right wing section of the Pakistani society maintains that Pakistan was attained in the name of Islam for the Muslims of the Sub-Continent. Pakistan was created so that the social order can be created based on Islamic principles and people can live their life in accordance with their religious values. A variation of Nazaria Pakistan uses a popular slogan used by the Muslims during the 1946 elections: “Pakistan means there is no God except Allah”.
There is no doubt that the terms Islam and Muslims were used interchangeably by Muslim League in the elections of 1946, which were fought for Pakistan. However, Nazaria Pakistan (NP) while acknowledges a separate homeland for Muslims, it introduces Islam as a way of life that encompasses not just the private lives, but also the public affairs for the Muslims living within the geographical boundaries. Our founding fathers were aware of the distinction; the thorny discussion about the role of religion in the affairs of the state was alive among the ML leadership.
There have been instances when Quaid specifically mentioned that religion in the affairs of state was not acceptable. We see that even though Quaid did not come out explicitly in favour of one mode of state policy, Quaid was explicit in mentioning what Pakistan would not be: Theocracy (complete rule of religion into the affairs of the state) will not happen in Pakistan.
At the same time, we see Quaid invoking Islamic principles frequently in his speeches, even after the creation of Pakistan. While the vagueness regarding the role of Islam in the affairs of the state, maintained by Quaid in pre-Independence communal environment was tactically required, some may argue that Quaid unnecessarily kept up the vagueness post independence; a fact that has come back to haunt Pakistan again and again.
Since Quaid towered above every other leader in the Muslim League, most Pakistanis try to find the meaning of Pakistan in Quaid’s words. Many have pounced on the vaguness embedded in Quaid’s statement; General Zia-ul-Haq frequently used selective Quaid’s quotes to justify the complete Islamization of Pakistan during his dark decade of rule.
THE TWO NATION THEORY AND THE CONDITIONAL DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN:
Why would a state still be unsure of its exact identity of being a Muslim or an Islamic State? In a rather strange way, Pakistan was a conditional demand employed by Jinnah and Muslim League leadership. They wanted to ensure that Muslims have adequate representation and safeguards and Muslims would not fare poorly even when they made up 30% of the total population of the United India. “Brother Gandhi has three votes, Brother Jinnah has one vote” was one of Jinnah’s famous quips to pound on the fact that despite their sheer numbers, Muslims had no say in the affairs of the government of the United India.
The idea of Pakistan was based on single or multiple states with Muslim majority within the United India, and Quaid showed willingness as late as 1946 to accept Pakistan with United Punjab and Bengal within the Indian Federation boundaries.
Importantly, the Liaqat-Desai coalition in 1945, and the acceptance of Cabinet Mission in 1946 were clear indications that if demands of Muslim League about representation of Indian Muslims within United India were met, they were prepared to remain in the United India.
Pakistan was as much a consequence of Muslims struggles for their rights and self interest, as it was due to the attitude of the leaders of Congress. Viewing Jinnah with disdain and contempt, they called him out on his demand, and to their disdain, Pakistan became a reality.
So what was the raison-d’être of Pakistan? Was it just a result of cataclysmic politics of the early 20th century, a turbulent decade of 1940s as Britain had lost will to govern India after fighting a great World War, or a result of genuine Muslim disenfranchisement that was expressed as early as 1870s by Sir Syed and Ameer Ali?
Most certainly all of the above were the cases. Muslims as a distinct nation was an idea that started appearing at the dusk of Mughal Empire, and gained steam as Muslims started lagging behind their Hindu counterparts in the British India. The Two Nation Theory certainly explains the genesis of Pakistan quite well.
I would venture here that the concept of Muslim Nationalism for the creation of Pakistan completely suffices the reason behind the creation of Pakistan. However, separating Muslim identity from all encompassing Islamic influence was left unclear, and the ambiguity distorted the subsequent vision of Pakistan.
THE FREE USE OF ISLAM BY MUSLIM LEAGUE, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT MOVES TO PAKISTAN:
Importantly, the events after 1937 were moving at a breakneck speed. In a matter of 7 years, Pakistan turned from a visionary ideal to a geographical reality. During the time leading up to Pakistan creations, two important factors had started to influence the new state:
1) Muslim League frequently invoked Islam during the campaign leading to the creation of Pakistan. During the pivotal 1946 elections “Muslim League activists toured the countryside (and) personal commitment to Islam became fused with an assertion of Muslim community solidarity. As one election official reported ‘wherever I went everyone kept saying, bhai if we did not vote for the League, we would have become a kafir (infidel)’ “.[1]
While the distinction between a Muslim majority secular state and a Muslim majority Islamic state is a lot clearer today, for the 1940s Muslim, the distinction was not as cut and dry. A Muslim living in early 20th century was seeing the majority community prosper, and had genuine fears about being dominated by the majority Hindus, with whom Muslims developed at best an uneasy community relationship. The Muslim nationalism espoused by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was developing into a full blown movement, as Congress failed to realize the fear and power of the sizeable Muslim minority.
In that environment, Muslim League rode the public opinion when it gave voice to the Muslim fears. The two words “Islam” and “Muslims” were used interchangeably. From various statements of Quaid and Liaqat Ali Khan, we can establish that their idea of democratic Muslim state did not involve theocratic rule. Yet Islam was a necessary symbol, and the references to Muslim ideas were expressed freely in leadership rallies.
At the same time, the religious right in India was moving to Pakistan, and they were determined to purposefully use the words “Muslim” and “Islamic” together, exploit the logical consequence of mixing religion and nation together.
2) Islamic right wing parties under Jamaat-e-Islami, Majlis-e-Ahrar, and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind, who had vociferously opposed the Muslim League and their Pakistan platform before, started moving en-masse towards Pakistan. By all indications, around the time of partition, the religious right spearheaded by Abu-al-Ala-Moudoudi was weary of the secular credentials of Muslim League Leaders. Mr. Moudoudi, in his various writings was warning against the western disposition of Jinnah and his colleagues, and was rightly worried that the Muslim League leadership was looking for a democratic Pakistan, but not a Sharia ruled state. In several of Mr. Moudoudi’s writings, he wrote against Muslim League and the Quaid:
“Pity! From League’s Quaid-e-Azam down to the lower cadres, there is not a single person who has an Islamic outlook and thinking and whose perspective on matters is Islamic”
“To pronounce these people fit for leading Muslims for the simple reason that they are experts of Western type politics and masters of Western organizational arts, and are deeply in love with their people, is a manifestation of an Unislamic viewpoint and reflects ignorance of Islam”.
“Even with a microscopic study of their practical life, and their thinking, ideology, political behaviour and style of leadership, one can find not a trace of Islamic character.” [2]
Mr. Moudoudi equated “Muslim Nationalism” with chaste prostitution, and scoffed at the ideas of modern democratic Muslim state.
Before partition, Muslim League’s main rival was Indian National Congress. After partition, the religious right had started positioning itself as one of the bigger rivals. The fight for Pakistan entered new grounds when Quaid died too soon after the independence. From then onwards, we see a haphazard approach towards Islam by the state, leading us to the present times.
Historians Thomas and Barbara Metcalf caught the dilemma facing Pakistan in the following words: “Pakistan was a modern nation state for India’s Muslim population. At the same time, however, as a symbol of Muslim identity, Pakistan transcended the ordinary structures of the state. As such it evoked an ideal Islamic political order, in which the realization of Islamic life would be fused with the state’s ritual authority. This Pakistan would not be simply an arena in which politicians, even if Muslims pursued their every day disputes. During the bloody upheavals of 1946 and 1947, Pakistan underwent a transformation from visionary ideal to territorial state. Yet it could not, after independence, shake off the legacy of its origin as a ‘pure’ land at once of Muslims and of a confessional Islam”[3]
QUAID’S REFERENCES TO THE ROLE OF ISLAM:
Pakistan’s uneasy relationship with Islam had started to brew even when Pakistan was a demand, not a state. Pakistan as an Islamic state idea was advanced by a small faction inside Muslim League, whose most visible face was Raja of Mahmudabad. He formed Islami Jamaat cell within the Muslim League. Raja Sahib mentioned to Jinnah that since “Lahore Resolution was passed earlier in the year, and when Pakistan was formed it was undoubtedly to be an Islamic State with the Sunnah and Shariah as its bedrock. The Quaid’s face went red and he turned to ask Raja whether he had taken leave of his senses. Mr. Jinnah added: `Did you realize that there are over seventy sects and differences of opinion regarding the Islamic faith, and if what the Raja was suggesting was to be followed, the consequences would be a struggle of religious opinion from the very inception of the State leading to its very dissolution. Mr. Jinnah banged his hands on the table and said: We shall not be an Islamic State but a Liberal Democratic Muslim State.”[4]
Raja Sahib Mahmudabad ended up getting expelled from the Muslim League. His relationship with Quaid deteriorated to such an extent that he saw Quaid just once after the independence. In his last years “Quaid’s prodigal child” admitted that his “insistence on Pakistan being an Islamic state and taking recourse to violence” was wrong[5]. Yet his ideas in the early 1940s show signs of visible discomfort shown by the Muslim League leaders as they were freely mixing the terms of Islamic and Muslim state.
The above episode was one of many where Quaid was clear in one aspect; that Pakistan would not be a theocratic state. He clearly mentioned in his message to the people of the United States that “Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission”. [6]
Or the famous speech to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947 where he laid down what many perceive as his clearest and unequivocal message to the lawmakers of the newly formed country “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State…. You will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State”
To emphasize how shocking Quaid’s speech was for everyone in Pakistan, Maulana Shabbir Usmani immediately yet subtly condemned Quaid’s words. He reminded that if it was not for Islam (the unifying force), religious leaders would not have entered the freedom struggle, and no political party (including the Muslim League) would have been able to mobilize the masses. He called for declaring the new country an Islamic Republic. Other leaders were less guarded in their remarks. Jamaat Islami leader Ahsan Islahi called a Pakistan based on Quaid’s August 11 speech principles a devil’s creation[7]
Muslim League used the slogans of “Pakistan ka Matlab kiyaa, La Ilaha Illallah (Pakistan means There is no God except Allah)” and “Muslim hai to Muslim League main aa (If you are a Muslim then you should be in the Muslim League)” during the election campaigns. Yet, we do see a documented case where Quaid admonished a Muslim League worker for using the slogan of Pakistan means no God except God in Muslim League first post Pakistan meeting in Karachi. Quaid said that individuals may have used that slogan for garnering votes, but no such slogan was approved by the Muslim League’s central committee.[8]
Some of the clearest signals about the equality of the creeds was coveyed by Quaid’s actions as Governor General of Pakistan. He appointed J.N. Mandal as his first Law Minister. Setting up a scheduled caste Hindu to head the pivotal ministry of law was a clear sign that Quaid was looking for the laws of the state to rise above the creeds. Sir Zafarullah Khan was appointed the first Foreign Minister, despite protests from the religious right for belonging to the Ahmedi sect. It is well documented that Quaid asked for a Hindu poet Jagan Nath Azad to write the first national anthem of Pakistan. With his actions Quaid was showing that a Muslim majority Pakistan belonged equally to every sect and creed. “Minorities will cease to be minorities in the new state .. You may belong to any religion, caste or creed – this has nothing to do with the business of the state”. Isn’t that what he was saying, in words as well his actions?
As Dr. Ayesha Jalal said “Jinnah’s resort to religion was not an ideology to which he was ever committed or even a device to use against rival communities; it was simply a way of giving a semblance of unity and solidity to his divided Muslim constituents”[9]
However, at the same time we do see instances where Quaid included Islam with the state. And this is where the same right wing leaders who bitterly opposed Jinnah and his party, come to the forefront to make him nothing sort of a religious leader. For example, in the same speech to the people of the United States in February 1948 he described Pakistan as a “premier Islamic State”. In another instance, Jinnah called Khan Brothers’ claims untrue that “PCA (Pakistan Constituent Assembly) will disregard the fundamental principles of the Shariah and Quranic laws”.
There were instances when Jinnah replied to the question of democracy by saying that Muslims had learnt democracy thirteen centuries ago. There have been various references to Quran and Sunnah in Jinnah speeches as well.
His speech to the State Bank of Pakistan in July 1948 stated: “We must work our destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on true Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social justice. We will thereby be fulfilling our mission as Muslims and giving to humanity the message of peace which alone can save it and secure the welfare, happiness and prosperity of mankind”
THE BACKDROP OF A TUMULTOUS NEW BORN PAKISTAN:
What do we make of the conflicing statements from Quaid? Most likely, Quaid’s use of term “Islamic” was used in lieu of the Muslim democratic state. However, a glance at the tumultuous years preceding and following the creation of Pakistan do explain the choice of words on Quaid’s part.
Partition brought with its bloody communal rioting that left up to a million people dead. Majority of those killed were Muslims that were looking to move to their new homeland. The body count was huge and by every indication, consumed the new government’s efforts. The state was strapped for cash and fighting for its very survival against a much larger and supremely unhappy neighbour. Kashmir mess was beginning to brew into a major conflict, and any considerations to set aside religion from the affairs of the state was put aside for a while, as the state tended to more urgent needs.
By all indications, Quaid was under intense pressure during his last year due to the problems facing Pakistan. Pakistan seemed to be fighting for its own survival. We catch Quaid’s foreboding words in his speech in Lahore University on October 30, 1947.
“We are in the midst of unparalleled difficulties and untold sufferings; we have been through dark days of apprehension and anguish…We have been the victims of deeply-laid and well-planned conspiracy executed with utter disregard of the elementary principles of honesty, chivalry and honour…Do not be afraid of death, our religion teaches us to be always prepared for death. We should face it bravely to save the honour of Pakistan and Islam. There is no better salvation for a Muslim than the death of a martyr for a religious cause”[10]
In the extremely uncertain formative year of Pakistan, the state was beset with too much uncertainty and fear. The fight for Pakistan was invoked as fight for Islam. The Islamic concepts of martyrdom were used for Pakistani martyrs. We simply cannot fathom a months old republic facing so many threats as soon as it came into being. Quaid kept invoking Islam in his official speeches. For a Muslim majority new born state in 1940s, can we seriously blame Quaid for doing that? Half a million Muslims had died during the partition violence. The next door giant of a neighbor was waiting for Pakistan to collapse. The uneven standards were applied by India when it laid claim to Kashmir; over time it would annex Deccan and Junagadh, all on one pretext or another.
It is quite clear from his statements that Quaid sincerely wanted a democratic Muslim Republic that would be inspired by Islamic ideals, but would not promulgate Islam as a state religion. He did give us clear occasional references about his ideals of Pakistan based on secular, humanist principles. Unfortunately, we have to make do with his words that were both a product of catastrophic uncertainty for the new nation, as well as Quaid’s personal ideals. I would go one step further and say his statements are not as mutually contradictory ideals sixty years ago as they may seem right now. Quaid was invoking Muslim ideals to rally the majority Muslim nation under the banner of Pakistan. But constant message we hear from his words and actions is that he wanted Pakistan to be a Liberal Democratic Muslim State. I would get to this point in detail in the final conclusion, and would also say for now that sixty years have shown that our founding fathers’ well meaning idea of a democratic Liberal Muslim Republic seemed nice on paper, but is anything but practical in the real world.
Sixty years later, as the inexactness of religion within the state offices of Pakistan takes its toll on the nation, we wonder if Quaid needed to be more firm in publicly specifying the exact role of religion in the affairs of the state. He was rapidly dying of consumption mixed in with a deadly form of lung cancer. We do get plenty of his statements that imbue his vision of democratic progressive Pakistan. But apart from the important Constituent Assembly speech on August 11, 1947, we have to make do with his actions, his statements spread across various speeches and interviews and meetings with different leaders.
It is an undeniable fact that the Quaid had united the disparate group of the political union of the Indian Muslims under one banner of Muslim League. Despite clear references to exclusion of religion from the state (or at best laws were to be inspired by the religious lessons), Quaid never explicitly came out in putting his personal stamp on the exact role of religion. Since Quaid remained such a pivotal figure in Pakistan’s genesis, his death effectively left the whole country searching for its exact identity.
We learn from his biography by Stanley Wolpert that Quaid was obsessed with drafting of the new constitution of Pakistan in his last year. We can imagine had he lived up to the completion of the constitution, Pakistan would have achieved a much revered document outlining the exact place of religion in the affairs of the state. It was not to be; we see barely 6 months into his death, the leadership had set itself on a confused path that haunts us even today. One non Muslim member of Assembly remarked on the Objectives Resolution: “What I hear in this (Objectives) Resolution is not the voice of the great creator of Pakistan – the Quaid-i-Azam, nor even that of the Prime Minister of Pakistan the Honourable Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, but of the Ulema of the land”.
A widely circulated ideology of Pakistan that is heavily promoted by the right wing section of the Pakistani society maintains that Pakistan was attained in the name of Islam for the Muslims of the Sub-Continent. Pakistan was created so that the social order can be created based on Islamic principles and people can live their life in accordance with their religious values. A variation of Nazaria Pakistan uses a popular slogan used by the Muslims during the 1946 elections: “Pakistan means there is no God except Allah”.
There is no doubt that the terms Islam and Muslims were used interchangeably by Muslim League in the elections of 1946, which were fought for Pakistan. However, Nazaria Pakistan (NP) while acknowledges a separate homeland for Muslims, it introduces Islam as a way of life that encompasses not just the private lives, but also the public affairs for the Muslims living within the geographical boundaries. Our founding fathers were aware of the distinction; the thorny discussion about the role of religion in the affairs of the state was alive among the ML leadership.
There have been instances when Quaid specifically mentioned that religion in the affairs of state was not acceptable. We see that even though Quaid did not come out explicitly in favour of one mode of state policy, Quaid was explicit in mentioning what Pakistan would not be: Theocracy (complete rule of religion into the affairs of the state) will not happen in Pakistan.
At the same time, we see Quaid invoking Islamic principles frequently in his speeches, even after the creation of Pakistan. While the vagueness regarding the role of Islam in the affairs of the state, maintained by Quaid in pre-Independence communal environment was tactically required, some may argue that Quaid unnecessarily kept up the vagueness post independence; a fact that has come back to haunt Pakistan again and again.
Since Quaid towered above every other leader in the Muslim League, most Pakistanis try to find the meaning of Pakistan in Quaid’s words. Many have pounced on the vaguness embedded in Quaid’s statement; General Zia-ul-Haq frequently used selective Quaid’s quotes to justify the complete Islamization of Pakistan during his dark decade of rule.
THE TWO NATION THEORY AND THE CONDITIONAL DEMAND FOR PAKISTAN:
Why would a state still be unsure of its exact identity of being a Muslim or an Islamic State? In a rather strange way, Pakistan was a conditional demand employed by Jinnah and Muslim League leadership. They wanted to ensure that Muslims have adequate representation and safeguards and Muslims would not fare poorly even when they made up 30% of the total population of the United India. “Brother Gandhi has three votes, Brother Jinnah has one vote” was one of Jinnah’s famous quips to pound on the fact that despite their sheer numbers, Muslims had no say in the affairs of the government of the United India.
The idea of Pakistan was based on single or multiple states with Muslim majority within the United India, and Quaid showed willingness as late as 1946 to accept Pakistan with United Punjab and Bengal within the Indian Federation boundaries.
Importantly, the Liaqat-Desai coalition in 1945, and the acceptance of Cabinet Mission in 1946 were clear indications that if demands of Muslim League about representation of Indian Muslims within United India were met, they were prepared to remain in the United India.
Pakistan was as much a consequence of Muslims struggles for their rights and self interest, as it was due to the attitude of the leaders of Congress. Viewing Jinnah with disdain and contempt, they called him out on his demand, and to their disdain, Pakistan became a reality.
So what was the raison-d’être of Pakistan? Was it just a result of cataclysmic politics of the early 20th century, a turbulent decade of 1940s as Britain had lost will to govern India after fighting a great World War, or a result of genuine Muslim disenfranchisement that was expressed as early as 1870s by Sir Syed and Ameer Ali?
Most certainly all of the above were the cases. Muslims as a distinct nation was an idea that started appearing at the dusk of Mughal Empire, and gained steam as Muslims started lagging behind their Hindu counterparts in the British India. The Two Nation Theory certainly explains the genesis of Pakistan quite well.
I would venture here that the concept of Muslim Nationalism for the creation of Pakistan completely suffices the reason behind the creation of Pakistan. However, separating Muslim identity from all encompassing Islamic influence was left unclear, and the ambiguity distorted the subsequent vision of Pakistan.
THE FREE USE OF ISLAM BY MUSLIM LEAGUE, THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT MOVES TO PAKISTAN:
Importantly, the events after 1937 were moving at a breakneck speed. In a matter of 7 years, Pakistan turned from a visionary ideal to a geographical reality. During the time leading up to Pakistan creations, two important factors had started to influence the new state:
1) Muslim League frequently invoked Islam during the campaign leading to the creation of Pakistan. During the pivotal 1946 elections “Muslim League activists toured the countryside (and) personal commitment to Islam became fused with an assertion of Muslim community solidarity. As one election official reported ‘wherever I went everyone kept saying, bhai if we did not vote for the League, we would have become a kafir (infidel)’ “.[1]
While the distinction between a Muslim majority secular state and a Muslim majority Islamic state is a lot clearer today, for the 1940s Muslim, the distinction was not as cut and dry. A Muslim living in early 20th century was seeing the majority community prosper, and had genuine fears about being dominated by the majority Hindus, with whom Muslims developed at best an uneasy community relationship. The Muslim nationalism espoused by Sir Syed Ahmed Khan was developing into a full blown movement, as Congress failed to realize the fear and power of the sizeable Muslim minority.
In that environment, Muslim League rode the public opinion when it gave voice to the Muslim fears. The two words “Islam” and “Muslims” were used interchangeably. From various statements of Quaid and Liaqat Ali Khan, we can establish that their idea of democratic Muslim state did not involve theocratic rule. Yet Islam was a necessary symbol, and the references to Muslim ideas were expressed freely in leadership rallies.
At the same time, the religious right in India was moving to Pakistan, and they were determined to purposefully use the words “Muslim” and “Islamic” together, exploit the logical consequence of mixing religion and nation together.
2) Islamic right wing parties under Jamaat-e-Islami, Majlis-e-Ahrar, and Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Hind, who had vociferously opposed the Muslim League and their Pakistan platform before, started moving en-masse towards Pakistan. By all indications, around the time of partition, the religious right spearheaded by Abu-al-Ala-Moudoudi was weary of the secular credentials of Muslim League Leaders. Mr. Moudoudi, in his various writings was warning against the western disposition of Jinnah and his colleagues, and was rightly worried that the Muslim League leadership was looking for a democratic Pakistan, but not a Sharia ruled state. In several of Mr. Moudoudi’s writings, he wrote against Muslim League and the Quaid:
“Pity! From League’s Quaid-e-Azam down to the lower cadres, there is not a single person who has an Islamic outlook and thinking and whose perspective on matters is Islamic”
“To pronounce these people fit for leading Muslims for the simple reason that they are experts of Western type politics and masters of Western organizational arts, and are deeply in love with their people, is a manifestation of an Unislamic viewpoint and reflects ignorance of Islam”.
“Even with a microscopic study of their practical life, and their thinking, ideology, political behaviour and style of leadership, one can find not a trace of Islamic character.” [2]
Mr. Moudoudi equated “Muslim Nationalism” with chaste prostitution, and scoffed at the ideas of modern democratic Muslim state.
Before partition, Muslim League’s main rival was Indian National Congress. After partition, the religious right had started positioning itself as one of the bigger rivals. The fight for Pakistan entered new grounds when Quaid died too soon after the independence. From then onwards, we see a haphazard approach towards Islam by the state, leading us to the present times.
Historians Thomas and Barbara Metcalf caught the dilemma facing Pakistan in the following words: “Pakistan was a modern nation state for India’s Muslim population. At the same time, however, as a symbol of Muslim identity, Pakistan transcended the ordinary structures of the state. As such it evoked an ideal Islamic political order, in which the realization of Islamic life would be fused with the state’s ritual authority. This Pakistan would not be simply an arena in which politicians, even if Muslims pursued their every day disputes. During the bloody upheavals of 1946 and 1947, Pakistan underwent a transformation from visionary ideal to territorial state. Yet it could not, after independence, shake off the legacy of its origin as a ‘pure’ land at once of Muslims and of a confessional Islam”[3]
QUAID’S REFERENCES TO THE ROLE OF ISLAM:
Pakistan’s uneasy relationship with Islam had started to brew even when Pakistan was a demand, not a state. Pakistan as an Islamic state idea was advanced by a small faction inside Muslim League, whose most visible face was Raja of Mahmudabad. He formed Islami Jamaat cell within the Muslim League. Raja Sahib mentioned to Jinnah that since “Lahore Resolution was passed earlier in the year, and when Pakistan was formed it was undoubtedly to be an Islamic State with the Sunnah and Shariah as its bedrock. The Quaid’s face went red and he turned to ask Raja whether he had taken leave of his senses. Mr. Jinnah added: `Did you realize that there are over seventy sects and differences of opinion regarding the Islamic faith, and if what the Raja was suggesting was to be followed, the consequences would be a struggle of religious opinion from the very inception of the State leading to its very dissolution. Mr. Jinnah banged his hands on the table and said: We shall not be an Islamic State but a Liberal Democratic Muslim State.”[4]
Raja Sahib Mahmudabad ended up getting expelled from the Muslim League. His relationship with Quaid deteriorated to such an extent that he saw Quaid just once after the independence. In his last years “Quaid’s prodigal child” admitted that his “insistence on Pakistan being an Islamic state and taking recourse to violence” was wrong[5]. Yet his ideas in the early 1940s show signs of visible discomfort shown by the Muslim League leaders as they were freely mixing the terms of Islamic and Muslim state.
The above episode was one of many where Quaid was clear in one aspect; that Pakistan would not be a theocratic state. He clearly mentioned in his message to the people of the United States that “Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic state to be ruled by priests with a divine mission”. [6]
Or the famous speech to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on August 11, 1947 where he laid down what many perceive as his clearest and unequivocal message to the lawmakers of the newly formed country “You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed – that has nothing to do with the business of the State…. You will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State”
To emphasize how shocking Quaid’s speech was for everyone in Pakistan, Maulana Shabbir Usmani immediately yet subtly condemned Quaid’s words. He reminded that if it was not for Islam (the unifying force), religious leaders would not have entered the freedom struggle, and no political party (including the Muslim League) would have been able to mobilize the masses. He called for declaring the new country an Islamic Republic. Other leaders were less guarded in their remarks. Jamaat Islami leader Ahsan Islahi called a Pakistan based on Quaid’s August 11 speech principles a devil’s creation[7]
Muslim League used the slogans of “Pakistan ka Matlab kiyaa, La Ilaha Illallah (Pakistan means There is no God except Allah)” and “Muslim hai to Muslim League main aa (If you are a Muslim then you should be in the Muslim League)” during the election campaigns. Yet, we do see a documented case where Quaid admonished a Muslim League worker for using the slogan of Pakistan means no God except God in Muslim League first post Pakistan meeting in Karachi. Quaid said that individuals may have used that slogan for garnering votes, but no such slogan was approved by the Muslim League’s central committee.[8]
Some of the clearest signals about the equality of the creeds was coveyed by Quaid’s actions as Governor General of Pakistan. He appointed J.N. Mandal as his first Law Minister. Setting up a scheduled caste Hindu to head the pivotal ministry of law was a clear sign that Quaid was looking for the laws of the state to rise above the creeds. Sir Zafarullah Khan was appointed the first Foreign Minister, despite protests from the religious right for belonging to the Ahmedi sect. It is well documented that Quaid asked for a Hindu poet Jagan Nath Azad to write the first national anthem of Pakistan. With his actions Quaid was showing that a Muslim majority Pakistan belonged equally to every sect and creed. “Minorities will cease to be minorities in the new state .. You may belong to any religion, caste or creed – this has nothing to do with the business of the state”. Isn’t that what he was saying, in words as well his actions?
As Dr. Ayesha Jalal said “Jinnah’s resort to religion was not an ideology to which he was ever committed or even a device to use against rival communities; it was simply a way of giving a semblance of unity and solidity to his divided Muslim constituents”[9]
However, at the same time we do see instances where Quaid included Islam with the state. And this is where the same right wing leaders who bitterly opposed Jinnah and his party, come to the forefront to make him nothing sort of a religious leader. For example, in the same speech to the people of the United States in February 1948 he described Pakistan as a “premier Islamic State”. In another instance, Jinnah called Khan Brothers’ claims untrue that “PCA (Pakistan Constituent Assembly) will disregard the fundamental principles of the Shariah and Quranic laws”.
There were instances when Jinnah replied to the question of democracy by saying that Muslims had learnt democracy thirteen centuries ago. There have been various references to Quran and Sunnah in Jinnah speeches as well.
His speech to the State Bank of Pakistan in July 1948 stated: “We must work our destiny in our own way and present to the world an economic system based on true Islamic concept of equality of manhood and social justice. We will thereby be fulfilling our mission as Muslims and giving to humanity the message of peace which alone can save it and secure the welfare, happiness and prosperity of mankind”
THE BACKDROP OF A TUMULTOUS NEW BORN PAKISTAN:
What do we make of the conflicing statements from Quaid? Most likely, Quaid’s use of term “Islamic” was used in lieu of the Muslim democratic state. However, a glance at the tumultuous years preceding and following the creation of Pakistan do explain the choice of words on Quaid’s part.
Partition brought with its bloody communal rioting that left up to a million people dead. Majority of those killed were Muslims that were looking to move to their new homeland. The body count was huge and by every indication, consumed the new government’s efforts. The state was strapped for cash and fighting for its very survival against a much larger and supremely unhappy neighbour. Kashmir mess was beginning to brew into a major conflict, and any considerations to set aside religion from the affairs of the state was put aside for a while, as the state tended to more urgent needs.
By all indications, Quaid was under intense pressure during his last year due to the problems facing Pakistan. Pakistan seemed to be fighting for its own survival. We catch Quaid’s foreboding words in his speech in Lahore University on October 30, 1947.
“We are in the midst of unparalleled difficulties and untold sufferings; we have been through dark days of apprehension and anguish…We have been the victims of deeply-laid and well-planned conspiracy executed with utter disregard of the elementary principles of honesty, chivalry and honour…Do not be afraid of death, our religion teaches us to be always prepared for death. We should face it bravely to save the honour of Pakistan and Islam. There is no better salvation for a Muslim than the death of a martyr for a religious cause”[10]
In the extremely uncertain formative year of Pakistan, the state was beset with too much uncertainty and fear. The fight for Pakistan was invoked as fight for Islam. The Islamic concepts of martyrdom were used for Pakistani martyrs. We simply cannot fathom a months old republic facing so many threats as soon as it came into being. Quaid kept invoking Islam in his official speeches. For a Muslim majority new born state in 1940s, can we seriously blame Quaid for doing that? Half a million Muslims had died during the partition violence. The next door giant of a neighbor was waiting for Pakistan to collapse. The uneven standards were applied by India when it laid claim to Kashmir; over time it would annex Deccan and Junagadh, all on one pretext or another.
It is quite clear from his statements that Quaid sincerely wanted a democratic Muslim Republic that would be inspired by Islamic ideals, but would not promulgate Islam as a state religion. He did give us clear occasional references about his ideals of Pakistan based on secular, humanist principles. Unfortunately, we have to make do with his words that were both a product of catastrophic uncertainty for the new nation, as well as Quaid’s personal ideals. I would go one step further and say his statements are not as mutually contradictory ideals sixty years ago as they may seem right now. Quaid was invoking Muslim ideals to rally the majority Muslim nation under the banner of Pakistan. But constant message we hear from his words and actions is that he wanted Pakistan to be a Liberal Democratic Muslim State. I would get to this point in detail in the final conclusion, and would also say for now that sixty years have shown that our founding fathers’ well meaning idea of a democratic Liberal Muslim Republic seemed nice on paper, but is anything but practical in the real world.
Sixty years later, as the inexactness of religion within the state offices of Pakistan takes its toll on the nation, we wonder if Quaid needed to be more firm in publicly specifying the exact role of religion in the affairs of the state. He was rapidly dying of consumption mixed in with a deadly form of lung cancer. We do get plenty of his statements that imbue his vision of democratic progressive Pakistan. But apart from the important Constituent Assembly speech on August 11, 1947, we have to make do with his actions, his statements spread across various speeches and interviews and meetings with different leaders.
It is an undeniable fact that the Quaid had united the disparate group of the political union of the Indian Muslims under one banner of Muslim League. Despite clear references to exclusion of religion from the state (or at best laws were to be inspired by the religious lessons), Quaid never explicitly came out in putting his personal stamp on the exact role of religion. Since Quaid remained such a pivotal figure in Pakistan’s genesis, his death effectively left the whole country searching for its exact identity.
We learn from his biography by Stanley Wolpert that Quaid was obsessed with drafting of the new constitution of Pakistan in his last year. We can imagine had he lived up to the completion of the constitution, Pakistan would have achieved a much revered document outlining the exact place of religion in the affairs of the state. It was not to be; we see barely 6 months into his death, the leadership had set itself on a confused path that haunts us even today. One non Muslim member of Assembly remarked on the Objectives Resolution: “What I hear in this (Objectives) Resolution is not the voice of the great creator of Pakistan – the Quaid-i-Azam, nor even that of the Prime Minister of Pakistan the Honourable Mr. Liaqat Ali Khan, but of the Ulema of the land”.
Sunday, October 11, 2009
Kenya drought 'has spared no one'
In Takaba town in north east Kenya, a crowd of people gather around a camel. The so-called ship of the desert has been weakened by drought and can barely move. When this happens, it takes an entire village to put it back on its feet.
Despite their best efforts the villagers are unable to lift the camel. After two hours of huffing and puffing, they have no choice but to leave the camel to die in the sun. They too have been weakened by the dry spell. Habiba Ibrahim, the owner of camel, watched the animal with tears in her eyes: "There is nothing I can do. There is no grass to give it due to the drought. This is one of my two remaining camels. The rest have all died."
The relentless drought across East Africa is worsening because of global climate change and the continued destruction of forests, grasslands, wetlands and other critical ecosystems, the United Nation's Environment Programme (UNEP) is warning. The Kenyan government says nearly four million people are now close to starvation after the rains have failed for three straight years.
Aid appeal
President Mwai Kibaki has declared the drought a national disaster and appealed for $150 million to feed the hungry.
Rural areas like northern Kenya, which have suffered decades of neglect and under-development, are most affected, with livestock herders particularly at risk.
"We have never seen a drought as bad as this... this drought has spared no place and no one. If it doesn't rain soon, the people will begin dying"
Abdille Qayleey, resident of Jowhar villageThese are areas with little access to education, healthcare, water and sanitation – making them even more vulnerable.
Cattle and goats – the weakest of the livestock species reared here, began dying a long time ago. In some places, livestock grazers have already lost entire herds to drought and disease. We met Abdille Qayleey in the village of Jowhar just outside Wajir town. He had 200 goats when the rains first failed. Today he has just 25 and they are too weak to provide a livelihood for his family of eleven.
"We have never seen a drought as bad as this," he told us. "In the past, droughts used to spare some places where we pastoralists would move to escape the drought. This drought has spared no place and no one. If it doesn't rain soon the people will begin dying."
Water is a scarce commodity for both man and beast. Wells have dried up and the few that still contain water are overused.
'Carcass-strewn watering holes'
What were once grazing land for nomads is fast turning into desert and it is the distance between pasture and water that is weakening the livestock further.
People come to the few boreholes still drawing water from more than 70-km away in search of water. The scene around it is horrific, carcass after carcass is strewn around the watering point – cattle and sheep mostly.
Families have been forced to share scant food aid with livestock [Picture: Save the Children]Some are now skeletons, others are in the process of losing their scant flesh to scavengers, and some are newly fallen, breathing their final breaths with their noses in the dust.
A group of women driving a donkey laden with containers of water told us they had been on the road for more than 15 hours in search of water.
"We have weak livestock at home. We are forced to provide them with water by such means. We will have to come back again after a few hours rest," they said. The drought situation is so bad in northern Kenya that the herdsmen have been forced to share what little food they receive from aid agencies with their weak animals.
People have also been forced to sell their assets, such as their remaining livestock, alleviating short term hunger but exacerbating long-term problems.
We visited the livestock market in Wajir, where scores of people gathered early to haggle over their remaining stock amid the swirling dust.
Suffering The livestock are so weak that the sellers know they won't make it back to their grazing areas alive; it's sell them or lose them and as a result it's a buyer's market. Prices have hit rock bottom, you can now buy a cow for around 300 Kenyan shillings - about four US dollars. Sheep, goats and camels are also on sale for measly amounts.
"There is little respite in sight for these people... Weather experts are predicting that floods caused by the El Nino weather phenomenon will follow the drought"You can see that the animals are suffering. There is now almost no pasture in the entire area and their hide is stretched tight over their protruding bones. The people too are stressed. They have little bargaining power. They either settle for the humiliating prices on offer or turn them down and risk losing everything on the long walk back. Either way, the descent into poverty is assured.
But people here don't understand climate change - the cause of their predicament. "How can man change the climate or stop rain? It is God's will that we are facing a drought. And we pray to him to alleviate our suffering." Halima Hassan, a 30-year-old mother of three whose livestock was wiped out by the drought, tells us.
As conditions worsen, conflict is breaking out between human beings and wildlife. Wild animals often come to settlements in search of water and attack herdsmen villages on an almost daily basis.
Frequent fights by nomads over dwindling resources have caused much destruction in this desolate region.
Yet there is little respite in sight for these people. Weather experts are predicting that floods caused by the El Nino weather phenomenon will follow the drought.
If that occurs the suffering we are now witnessing will pale in comparison to what will come.
Despite their best efforts the villagers are unable to lift the camel. After two hours of huffing and puffing, they have no choice but to leave the camel to die in the sun. They too have been weakened by the dry spell. Habiba Ibrahim, the owner of camel, watched the animal with tears in her eyes: "There is nothing I can do. There is no grass to give it due to the drought. This is one of my two remaining camels. The rest have all died."
The relentless drought across East Africa is worsening because of global climate change and the continued destruction of forests, grasslands, wetlands and other critical ecosystems, the United Nation's Environment Programme (UNEP) is warning. The Kenyan government says nearly four million people are now close to starvation after the rains have failed for three straight years.
Aid appeal
President Mwai Kibaki has declared the drought a national disaster and appealed for $150 million to feed the hungry.
Rural areas like northern Kenya, which have suffered decades of neglect and under-development, are most affected, with livestock herders particularly at risk.
"We have never seen a drought as bad as this... this drought has spared no place and no one. If it doesn't rain soon, the people will begin dying"
Abdille Qayleey, resident of Jowhar villageThese are areas with little access to education, healthcare, water and sanitation – making them even more vulnerable.
Cattle and goats – the weakest of the livestock species reared here, began dying a long time ago. In some places, livestock grazers have already lost entire herds to drought and disease. We met Abdille Qayleey in the village of Jowhar just outside Wajir town. He had 200 goats when the rains first failed. Today he has just 25 and they are too weak to provide a livelihood for his family of eleven.
"We have never seen a drought as bad as this," he told us. "In the past, droughts used to spare some places where we pastoralists would move to escape the drought. This drought has spared no place and no one. If it doesn't rain soon the people will begin dying."
Water is a scarce commodity for both man and beast. Wells have dried up and the few that still contain water are overused.
'Carcass-strewn watering holes'
What were once grazing land for nomads is fast turning into desert and it is the distance between pasture and water that is weakening the livestock further.
People come to the few boreholes still drawing water from more than 70-km away in search of water. The scene around it is horrific, carcass after carcass is strewn around the watering point – cattle and sheep mostly.
Families have been forced to share scant food aid with livestock [Picture: Save the Children]Some are now skeletons, others are in the process of losing their scant flesh to scavengers, and some are newly fallen, breathing their final breaths with their noses in the dust.
A group of women driving a donkey laden with containers of water told us they had been on the road for more than 15 hours in search of water.
"We have weak livestock at home. We are forced to provide them with water by such means. We will have to come back again after a few hours rest," they said. The drought situation is so bad in northern Kenya that the herdsmen have been forced to share what little food they receive from aid agencies with their weak animals.
People have also been forced to sell their assets, such as their remaining livestock, alleviating short term hunger but exacerbating long-term problems.
We visited the livestock market in Wajir, where scores of people gathered early to haggle over their remaining stock amid the swirling dust.
Suffering The livestock are so weak that the sellers know they won't make it back to their grazing areas alive; it's sell them or lose them and as a result it's a buyer's market. Prices have hit rock bottom, you can now buy a cow for around 300 Kenyan shillings - about four US dollars. Sheep, goats and camels are also on sale for measly amounts.
"There is little respite in sight for these people... Weather experts are predicting that floods caused by the El Nino weather phenomenon will follow the drought"You can see that the animals are suffering. There is now almost no pasture in the entire area and their hide is stretched tight over their protruding bones. The people too are stressed. They have little bargaining power. They either settle for the humiliating prices on offer or turn them down and risk losing everything on the long walk back. Either way, the descent into poverty is assured.
But people here don't understand climate change - the cause of their predicament. "How can man change the climate or stop rain? It is God's will that we are facing a drought. And we pray to him to alleviate our suffering." Halima Hassan, a 30-year-old mother of three whose livestock was wiped out by the drought, tells us.
As conditions worsen, conflict is breaking out between human beings and wildlife. Wild animals often come to settlements in search of water and attack herdsmen villages on an almost daily basis.
Frequent fights by nomads over dwindling resources have caused much destruction in this desolate region.
Yet there is little respite in sight for these people. Weather experts are predicting that floods caused by the El Nino weather phenomenon will follow the drought.
If that occurs the suffering we are now witnessing will pale in comparison to what will come.
Iceland looks to serve the world
Since the financial crisis, Iceland has been forced to retreat back from high octane bubble living to nature.Fortunately, there is a lot of that nature to retreat to.
It is a breathtaking world of volcanoes, endless prairies and ethereal winter landscapes.
Not, you might think, the most obvious place to stick millions of the world's computer servers which are, for all their uses, rather less attractive.
But the country now wants exactly that - to become home to the world's computing power.
Behind all the large internet companies lurk massive and ever growing data centres chock full of servers churning away.
Google for instance is thought to have around a million of the things, but even less IT intensive operations, banks for example, need hundreds of thousands of servers to store all their data.
Up to 60% extra energy is required to cool computer servers in the UK
The problem is that while these computers look innocuous, they use a lot of energy.
There is of course the power you need for the servers themselves, but almost as significant is the energy used to keep them cool.
"For every watt that is spent running servers," says Dr Brad Karp, of University College London, "the best enterprises most careful about minimising the energy of cooling and maximising efficiency typically find they are spending 40-60% extra energy on just cooling them."
Cold rush
In Iceland, with its year round cool climate and chilly fresh water, just a fraction of this energy for cooling is needed. It means big savings.
Just outside Reykjavik, work is well advanced on the first site which its owners hope will spark a server cold rush.
In around a year - if all goes according to plan - the first companies will start leasing space in this data centre.
And if this proves successful more sites are planned.
The company expects demand to be huge because as the number of servers around the world grows, a big environmental cloud is looming - all that energy use means an increase in CO2 production.
Iceland has far more power than it can domestically use.
"The data centre industry now is on par with the airline industry as far as the carbon footprint," says Jeff Monroe, head of Verne Global - a data centre company working in Iceland.
A company would save greater than half a million metric tons of carbon annually
Jeff Monroe, CEO of Verne Global
"But, if you think about the growth of those two industries, the growth of the data centre industry is exponentially greater than the airline industry.
"The two are going to cross and we think that - just like the legislation that was passed in the UK concerning carbon footprint and power utilisation - it is going to be a growing concern across the industry."
So data centres are already producing as much CO2 as airlines.
While it has been below the radar until now, Verne Global thinks that with cloud computing on the rise, the carbon footprint of the digital world will soon become "unacceptably high".
And this is where Iceland's natural resources really come into their own.
Enormous savings
The volcanic forces which shaped the landscape have also gifted the country masses of geothermal power - 100% of the country's electricity is renewable and basically carbon free, much generated from water heated far below the ground.
Mr Monroe explains what would happen if a company moved its data centre to Iceland.
"The carbon savings would be enormous.
All of Iceland's electricity is renewable and basically carbon free
"For example, if a large internet media company operating thousands and thousands of servers relocated its servers to Iceland, that company would save greater than half a million metric tons of carbon annually."
So you have the cooler climate and an abundance of green energy.
But you would not want to move your previous data centre to what is effectively the middle of nowhere unless it had some good connections.
Iceland has been busying itself laying fibre optic cables to connect the country with North America and Europe.
The cables coming in provide a capacity of more than five terabits/sec - all with server farms in mind.
Travelling down this pipe, data sited in Iceland is just 17 milliseconds from London. Sitting at home on YouTube you would never know, but even that is too slow for some.
Big industry
Gudmundur Gunnarsson, head of communications company Farice, explains some of the problems.
"There are very sensitive financial services that cannot even go outside the M25 in London", he says.
"So everything has to be within that circle, but for approximately at least 70% of other traffic, this delay is more than satisfactory."
Even where speed is not an issue however, the allure of Iceland is not for everyone.
Companies will have to overcome their natural server-hugging tendencies, and some may harbour security fears of storing their data remotely.
But having been through the financial mill Iceland hopes and believes in the next five to 10 years this will be one of its biggest industries.
And, in an irony not lost on a country brought to its knees by finance, one early customer rumoured to have signed a deal to move servers here is - well who else - one of America's biggest investment banks.
The Military’s Ideology
By Ayesha Siddiqa
The country’s ruling elite and the military have traditionally used a particular aspect of religion to gain strategic dividends. —File Photo
PAKISTAN observers often wonder what the Pakistan military’s primary ideology is. Is it a secular institution or one which is high on religious values? Since the military is considered the strongest institution of the Pakistani state, the question becomes critical in determining what direction the country will take or how its armed forces will fight the war on terror.
One particular perspective is that the military is essentially a secular institution which got transformed temporarily under Gen Ziaul Haq, who made sure that his officers had a religious grounding. He had allowed the tableeghi jamaat to penetrate the armed forces and introduced a religiously conservative current in society. Subsequently, the Zia era was blamed for the continued links between certain military personnel and the Taliban post-9/11.
Later, it was argued that Gen Pervez Musharraf put the military back on the secular track by weeding out religious-minded, senior officers replacing them with others who were socially acceptable to the international community. In fact, senior officers now claim that the military is highly professional and secular. This is correct in that ‘secular’ in this case means that the army is not driven purely by religious instincts in pursuing its goals. But then ‘religious’ or ‘secular’ are not the right terms to describe the organisation.
Indeed, if one is searching for the correct term, it would be pragmatic-nationalist. This means that instead of sticking to one ideology the institution can shift between a couple or more ideologies at the same time. So, when it was convenient to turn religiously ideological during the 1980s it could do so. Even Gen Zia was not solely driven by his personal inclination to support the Afghan ‘jihad’; the geo-strategic and geopolitical environment was important in the framing of decisions. There was no dichotomy between pursuing jihad and having a strategic alignment with the US even then.
Zia also found religious ideology handy in pursuing other military-strategic goals. Deploying non-state actors was financially, politically and militarily cost-effective. Hence, all generals maintained links with the jihadis despite the fact that they were different from Zia.
The pragmatist-nationalist character of the military also explains why it was able to swiftly shift between ideologies, especially after it had to undergo a change in the wake of 9/11. This also means that maintaining links with the different jihadi organisations, as explained by Arif Jamal in Shadow War: the Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir, does not necessarily depend on having a religious ideology.
The author’s interesting conclusion is that even seemingly ‘secular’ generals like the present chief, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, could pursue the same policy as the generals during the 1990s. Jamal claims that a lot of jihadi organisations were thrilled to hear of the appointment of Gen Kayani as the new chief and many reopened their offices in 2008. He also argues that several meetings were arranged between the various Afghan Taliban groups and the Kashmiri jihadis in 2007 by the ISI to help them with a strategy to stop Indian help from reaching Hamid Karzai’s government in Kabul and placing more sleeper cells in India for possible activation at later dates.
This argument explains the character of the Pakistan Army and its use of religion or at least one aspect of it, namely jihad, for its strategic advantage. There is nothing odd in the argument since the military was part of what was described by Hamza Alavi as the Muslim salariat class, which used religion to motivate a movement for an independent state.
The fact is that this class was always linked to the use of religious ideology. It might not want to adopt a Saudi model for state-making, though the Pakistani state has gradually moved closer to Saudi Arabia, but religion has always remained central to the fulfilment of the strategic goals of the salariat, which later evolved into the ruling elite.
This basically meant that while the Islamic norms of social justice might not be adopted, religious identity would be used in some form to meet political and military-strategic objectives. Jamal’s argument is that like all such plans that generate opportunity costs, the jihadis of today, who seem to be challenging the Pakistani state, are inadvertently a product of a specific plan to fight the war in Kashmir.
The camps where Ajmal Qasab and others were trained by the Lashkar-i-Taiba to carry out the Mumbai attacks, the author claims, were set up by the ISI to win the war in Kashmir. Even if the attack was not ordered by the intelligence agency, it indicates a situation where the jihadis trained for a particular purpose might have used their training to carry out attacks on their own or gone beyond the brief.
Obviously, the military always had to use religion as a motivating factor from the time when Col Akhtar Malik planned the first offensive to capture Kashmir in 1947/48 to the 1980s and 1990s when, according to Jamal, a lot of new jihadi organisations were established. Gen Ayub Khan adopted a similar approach while planning the historic but failed Operation Gibraltar in 1965. However, the military was not the only force which used the above-mentioned approach.
Even seemingly liberal-secular leaders like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto favoured the policy of using non-state actors to the country’s perceived military advantage. For instance, Bhutto personally came to congratulate the hijackers of an Indian Airlines flight in January 1971. It is important to remember that the use of non-state actors was part of a larger package of mixing religion with state strategy.
In adopting this approach Bhutto might have not been too far off from Ziaul Haq who, as Jamal argues, developed an alignment with the Jamaat-i-Islami to support the Afghan jihad and to use that as a cover for strengthening the army’s war in Kashmir.
The country’s ruling elite and the military have traditionally used a particular aspect of religion to gain strategic dividends. While they can conveniently claim to have retained their secularism and saved one organisation from turning ideological, a similar claim might not be made for society at large. The proliferation of ‘jihad’ in mainland Pakistan is but the opportunity cost of strategy.
The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.
ayesha.ibd@gmail.com
The country’s ruling elite and the military have traditionally used a particular aspect of religion to gain strategic dividends. —File Photo
PAKISTAN observers often wonder what the Pakistan military’s primary ideology is. Is it a secular institution or one which is high on religious values? Since the military is considered the strongest institution of the Pakistani state, the question becomes critical in determining what direction the country will take or how its armed forces will fight the war on terror.
One particular perspective is that the military is essentially a secular institution which got transformed temporarily under Gen Ziaul Haq, who made sure that his officers had a religious grounding. He had allowed the tableeghi jamaat to penetrate the armed forces and introduced a religiously conservative current in society. Subsequently, the Zia era was blamed for the continued links between certain military personnel and the Taliban post-9/11.
Later, it was argued that Gen Pervez Musharraf put the military back on the secular track by weeding out religious-minded, senior officers replacing them with others who were socially acceptable to the international community. In fact, senior officers now claim that the military is highly professional and secular. This is correct in that ‘secular’ in this case means that the army is not driven purely by religious instincts in pursuing its goals. But then ‘religious’ or ‘secular’ are not the right terms to describe the organisation.
Indeed, if one is searching for the correct term, it would be pragmatic-nationalist. This means that instead of sticking to one ideology the institution can shift between a couple or more ideologies at the same time. So, when it was convenient to turn religiously ideological during the 1980s it could do so. Even Gen Zia was not solely driven by his personal inclination to support the Afghan ‘jihad’; the geo-strategic and geopolitical environment was important in the framing of decisions. There was no dichotomy between pursuing jihad and having a strategic alignment with the US even then.
Zia also found religious ideology handy in pursuing other military-strategic goals. Deploying non-state actors was financially, politically and militarily cost-effective. Hence, all generals maintained links with the jihadis despite the fact that they were different from Zia.
The pragmatist-nationalist character of the military also explains why it was able to swiftly shift between ideologies, especially after it had to undergo a change in the wake of 9/11. This also means that maintaining links with the different jihadi organisations, as explained by Arif Jamal in Shadow War: the Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir, does not necessarily depend on having a religious ideology.
The author’s interesting conclusion is that even seemingly ‘secular’ generals like the present chief, Gen Ashfaq Kayani, could pursue the same policy as the generals during the 1990s. Jamal claims that a lot of jihadi organisations were thrilled to hear of the appointment of Gen Kayani as the new chief and many reopened their offices in 2008. He also argues that several meetings were arranged between the various Afghan Taliban groups and the Kashmiri jihadis in 2007 by the ISI to help them with a strategy to stop Indian help from reaching Hamid Karzai’s government in Kabul and placing more sleeper cells in India for possible activation at later dates.
This argument explains the character of the Pakistan Army and its use of religion or at least one aspect of it, namely jihad, for its strategic advantage. There is nothing odd in the argument since the military was part of what was described by Hamza Alavi as the Muslim salariat class, which used religion to motivate a movement for an independent state.
The fact is that this class was always linked to the use of religious ideology. It might not want to adopt a Saudi model for state-making, though the Pakistani state has gradually moved closer to Saudi Arabia, but religion has always remained central to the fulfilment of the strategic goals of the salariat, which later evolved into the ruling elite.
This basically meant that while the Islamic norms of social justice might not be adopted, religious identity would be used in some form to meet political and military-strategic objectives. Jamal’s argument is that like all such plans that generate opportunity costs, the jihadis of today, who seem to be challenging the Pakistani state, are inadvertently a product of a specific plan to fight the war in Kashmir.
The camps where Ajmal Qasab and others were trained by the Lashkar-i-Taiba to carry out the Mumbai attacks, the author claims, were set up by the ISI to win the war in Kashmir. Even if the attack was not ordered by the intelligence agency, it indicates a situation where the jihadis trained for a particular purpose might have used their training to carry out attacks on their own or gone beyond the brief.
Obviously, the military always had to use religion as a motivating factor from the time when Col Akhtar Malik planned the first offensive to capture Kashmir in 1947/48 to the 1980s and 1990s when, according to Jamal, a lot of new jihadi organisations were established. Gen Ayub Khan adopted a similar approach while planning the historic but failed Operation Gibraltar in 1965. However, the military was not the only force which used the above-mentioned approach.
Even seemingly liberal-secular leaders like Zulfikar Ali Bhutto favoured the policy of using non-state actors to the country’s perceived military advantage. For instance, Bhutto personally came to congratulate the hijackers of an Indian Airlines flight in January 1971. It is important to remember that the use of non-state actors was part of a larger package of mixing religion with state strategy.
In adopting this approach Bhutto might have not been too far off from Ziaul Haq who, as Jamal argues, developed an alignment with the Jamaat-i-Islami to support the Afghan jihad and to use that as a cover for strengthening the army’s war in Kashmir.
The country’s ruling elite and the military have traditionally used a particular aspect of religion to gain strategic dividends. While they can conveniently claim to have retained their secularism and saved one organisation from turning ideological, a similar claim might not be made for society at large. The proliferation of ‘jihad’ in mainland Pakistan is but the opportunity cost of strategy.
The writer is an independent strategic and political analyst.
ayesha.ibd@gmail.com
Saturday, October 10, 2009
One in four is Muslim, study says
A report from an American think-tank has estimated 1.57 billion Muslims populate the world - with 60% in Asia.
The report, by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, took three years to compile, with census data from 232 countries and territories.
It showed that 20% of Muslims lived in the Middle East and North Africa.
The data also showed that there were more Muslims in Germany than in Lebanon, and more in Russia than in Jordan and Libya together.
Surprise
Researchers analysed approximately 1,500 sources including census reports, demographic studies and general population surveys.
Senior researcher Brian Grim told CNN that the overall figure was a surprise and said: "Overall, the number is higher than I expected."
The report, published on Wednesday, also found that Ethiopia has nearly as many Muslims as Afghanistan.
MUSLIM POPULATION BY REGION
Asia and the Pacific: 61.9%
Middle East - North Africa: 20.1%
Sub-Saharan Africa: 15.3%
Europe: 2.4%
Americas: 0.3%
Amaney Jamal, an assistant professor of politics at Princeton University, told the AP news agency: "This whole idea that Muslims are Arabs and Arabs are Muslims is really just obliterated by this report."
Instead the report found that more than 300 million Muslims live in countries where Islam was not the majority religion.
Of the total Muslim population, 10-13% are Shia Muslims and 87-90% are Sunni Muslims.
Most Shias live in Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq.
Europe is home to 38 million Muslims - around 5% of its population with European Muslims making up slightly more than 2% of the world's Muslim population.
More than half of the 4.6 million Muslims in the Americas live in the US - however they make up just 0.8% of the population there.
The Pew Forum has said the findings will lay the foundation for a forthcoming study that will look at how Muslim populations worldwide have grown and what they may look like in the future.
It also plans to compile figures for the other major world religions.
According to internet-based group, Adherents, there are currently 2.1 billion Christians, 900 million Hindus and 14 million Jews worldwide.
The report, by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, took three years to compile, with census data from 232 countries and territories.
It showed that 20% of Muslims lived in the Middle East and North Africa.
The data also showed that there were more Muslims in Germany than in Lebanon, and more in Russia than in Jordan and Libya together.
Surprise
Researchers analysed approximately 1,500 sources including census reports, demographic studies and general population surveys.
Senior researcher Brian Grim told CNN that the overall figure was a surprise and said: "Overall, the number is higher than I expected."
The report, published on Wednesday, also found that Ethiopia has nearly as many Muslims as Afghanistan.
MUSLIM POPULATION BY REGION
Asia and the Pacific: 61.9%
Middle East - North Africa: 20.1%
Sub-Saharan Africa: 15.3%
Europe: 2.4%
Americas: 0.3%
Amaney Jamal, an assistant professor of politics at Princeton University, told the AP news agency: "This whole idea that Muslims are Arabs and Arabs are Muslims is really just obliterated by this report."
Instead the report found that more than 300 million Muslims live in countries where Islam was not the majority religion.
Of the total Muslim population, 10-13% are Shia Muslims and 87-90% are Sunni Muslims.
Most Shias live in Iran, Pakistan, India and Iraq.
Europe is home to 38 million Muslims - around 5% of its population with European Muslims making up slightly more than 2% of the world's Muslim population.
More than half of the 4.6 million Muslims in the Americas live in the US - however they make up just 0.8% of the population there.
The Pew Forum has said the findings will lay the foundation for a forthcoming study that will look at how Muslim populations worldwide have grown and what they may look like in the future.
It also plans to compile figures for the other major world religions.
According to internet-based group, Adherents, there are currently 2.1 billion Christians, 900 million Hindus and 14 million Jews worldwide.
AKBAR BUGTI & AFTER
The discussion focused on the developments in Balochistan after the brutal killing of Akbar Khan Bugti, the leader of Bugti tribe. Linkages to past insurgencies in the region, demands of the Baloch Sardars, interests of Baloch sub tribes, involvement of a foreign hand and the role of the Pakistani army in Bugti's killing were some of the significant factors examined. Another crucial issue debated was whether Bugti's death is a 'national disaster' for Pakistan or just a 'military initiative.'
C Rajamohan
Significant developments have taken place in Pakistan in the past few weeks. However, India needs to be extremely cautious and objective while assessing these developments. The death of Akbar Khan Bugti is an important event for the opposition parties in Pakistan. But it is still unclear whether this will serve as ammunition in their hands. Even the PML-Q headed by Shujaat Husain, which is supposed to be a supporter of the central government, has expressed regret on Bugti's death.
Kalim Bahadur
Akbar Bugti possessed a complex and contradictory personality. He was a typical feudal lord having an authoritarian and criminal bent of mind. He became the Governor of Balochistan in 1973 and helped Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to suppress the insurgency and was the only tribal warlord to do so. He never spoke about separatism. He had supported Baloch accession to Pakistan in 1948 unlike other tribal Sardars who had opposed it. Therefore, his importance for Pakistan should have been greater. The year 1948 marked the beginning of Baloch alienation. The first insurgency took place in the same year. Three more insurgencies took place thereafter in 1958, 1963 and 1973.
In 1973, Bhutto decided to abolish the Sardari system. He introduced limited industrialization and education that gave birth to a new working class as well as a section of radicals. This period also strengthened the growing nationalist movement in Balochistan.
Many contradictions characterize Balochistan. It is a tribal society led by Sardars. Women possess no rights amidst a simultaneous growth of a radical movement. Neither Bhutto nor the Sardars ever initiated serious measures to overcome backwardness in the region. The rate of literacy in Balochistan is 24 percent as compared to 36 percent in Pakistan. Balochistan also has the highest child mortality rate.
The discovery of Sui gas in the late 1950s exposed the rich natural resource base of Balochistan. However, the region has not reaped all the benefits accruing to it from its resources. For example, Quetta is the only beneficiary of the gas from Sui. Moreover, only five percent of people have piped water in Balochistan. There are no Baloch soldiers or officers in the Baloch regiment and only 90 out of 12,000 coast guards are from Balochistan.
Military regimes are largely centralized systems. As a result, all Baloch problems are discussed and resolved in Islamabad. People in Balochistan are wary of mega projects initiated by Pakistan as they fear these projects may result in unemployment, underemployment and turn the local population into a minority. For example, the Baloch are against the functioning of the Gwadar port that employs large umber of Chinese nationals. They also demand an abolition of the Concurrent list. There is a government in Balochistan but elections are rigged and it has no power. This has instigated the Marris, Bugtis and Mengals (the three main tribes in Balochistan) to protest against the discriminatory policies of the government.
Bugti received 12 million rupees from the Centre as royalty for Sui gas and one million rupees as transportation charges. Many are of the opinion that Bugti was running a 'self serving' movement in Balochistan, in order to get more royalty on Sui. The Military regime did not consider it important to fulfill the demands of a small province like Balochistan and saw Bugti as representing the vested interests of a small minority group. This was the main reason for killing him.
D Suba Chandran
Bugti's killing has not yet become a political disaster. It was a military initiative with no involvement of the political elite. Musharraf has won the 'battle' but the 'war' against Baloch nationalism is far from over. Also, without external support, Baloch nationalist movement will not succeed.
Firstly, circumstances prevailing prior to Bugti's killing need to be closely examined. The sub tribes of the Bugtis namely Kalpars and Masuris have been traditional opponents of Akbar Bugti. The military regime purposely pushed the Kalpars back to Dera Bugti and Sui areas, while Musharraf tried to side with the Kalpars on their claim over Sui and the royalty accruing from it in order to weaken Akbar Bugti's position.?????????? Moreover, there were series of surrenders by Marri and Bugti tribesmen and Musharraf ensured that no political vacuum prevailed before the killing of Bugti. Two days before the killing, a tribal jirga comprising of most of the sub tribes was held that decided to confiscate Bugti's property. The jirga agreed on the prevalence of Pakistani Law and abolition of the Sardari system.
Sui is highly important to Pakistan due to its rich gas reserves, royalty and supplies. Therefore, killing of Bugti aimed at teaching him a lesson for trying to gain more benefits from the area.
Secondly, the future of the Baloch nationalist movement is unclear. Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, and Nawab Khair Bux Marri had their own differences that resulted in numerous egoistic clashes. With the killing of Bugti, the question is who will represent him? There is an intra family clash among the Bugtis over the new Sardar's position. The alliance of the heads of three tribes against the centre is in trouble. However, another view is that by killing Bugti, Musharraf has made him a national 'hero.'
Thirdly, the Balochistan Liberation Army or BLA does not have the capability to fight a long waged war against the army or carry out guerilla warfare. It remains a Marri militia and the involvement of Bugtis and Mengals is limited. The role of the middle class and the Baloch Diaspora in the BLA has to be analyzed in greater depth. It is doubtful if the BLA will become a potent force to reckon with, given its inherent weakness and strength of Pakistan's 'lethal' armed forces.
So far, it is a military initiative and not a 'national disaster' and the opposition has not been able to mobilize or push for the no-confidence motion. Even the PML-Q has not split. The MMA will decide whether it wants to continue its membership in the Baloch Legislative Assembly. Thus, Bugti's killing has not become a rallying point for the political parties. Only some border districts of Sindh and Karachi have witnessed violence and protests while other districts are peaceful. The killing of Bugti is more a mistake than a disaster.
Many believe that US has vested interests in the region because of the Chinese presence and interest in Gwadar. It is important to bear in mind that neither the Baloch nationalist movement nor the Baloch armed movement will succeed until they get proactive external support.
C Rajamohan
In Pakistan, the common view is that Balochistan is receiving external support from India. However, the US, Chinese and Iranian interests too play a crucial role given the geopolitics of the region. Therefore, the implications of Bugti's killing for India need to be analyzed comprehensively.
Comments
· Three questions come to mind concerning foreign influence in Balochistan: (a) did the United States support the killing of Akbar Bugti? (b) Is it not too late for them to show an interest in Gwadar and do they want to control the area? (c) Will Pakistan step-up its operation in Kashmir in reaction to India's official declaration of support to Balochistan??
· The media is exaggerating the situation in Balochistan by portraying Bugti as a martyr and comparing the crisis in the region to the alienation of East Pakistan in the 1960s. We should focus on the situation in India itself, rather than exaggerate the Balochistan case.?
· Though Akbar Bugti had been trying to rally the Balochis around him and had held most of the important posts in Pakistan; he was regarded with suspicion. His death could unite the Balochis in a way that he could not achieve while he was alive. The threat that he represented to other leaders will no longer be there after his death. There was a general strike in Balochistan immediately after the death of Bugti. Therefore it would be incorrect to say that Bugti's death had no effect on events in Balochistan. ?
· The question of foreign assistance to Balochistan is an important issue to be examined. Gwadar is completed and has the potential to become a new Dubai. However this can only happen if it is connected to the hinterland. China intends to build pipelines and roads from Gilgit to Gwadar. The US thus has a vested interest in making it impossible for China to gain access to Gwadar. ?
· Can the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) sustain the insurgency in Balochistan in the same manner as in Iraq or Afghanistan? Does it have the resources and wherewithal to fight? ?
· According to the reports originating from Pakistan, the Pakistani establishment is trying hard to make the whole affair appear as an individual action against Balochistan by Musharraf and not as an attack from the Pakistani federal state. ?
· The US realizes that Musharraf is a very dependable ally. However, it is highly debatable whether Russia would be prepared to fight off Gwadar by supporting the Balochi struggle and risk antagonizing Iran with which it has good relations. ?
· The Indian focus has shifted from Punjab to Balochistan in Pakistan. But India's support to the Balochi cause is questionable. A distinction should be made between supporting democratic movements and supporting violent movements.?
· The Pakistani army has evaded responsibilities in the aftermath of Bugti's killing. According to a Bugti tribe guide, Akbar Bugti died due to the collapse of the cave he was living in and not due to any military action. Initially the Army bragged about killing him but later distanced itself from Bugti's killing fearing a backlash.
Responses
Kalim Bahadur
· India is and should support the Balochi cause because it is in India's interest to do so. The Indian statement supporting the establishment of democracy in Balochistan should be viewed in this light. ?
· Gwadar is a Chinese project in a strategic and vital location. Balochistan gives access to Central Asia and Afghanistan, with the possibility of pipelines between these regions and the Indian Ocean. Therefore it is not surprising that India, the US and Russia are also extremely interested in Gwadar.
D Suba Chandran
· A comparison between Balochistan and East Pakistan is irrelevant not only because the two regions are extremely different (For example, Balochistan is a tribal land) but also because no country can currently provide such a large-scale support to Balochistan as India did to East Pakistan in the 1960s.?
· Indian interests in Balochistan are limited by the fact that it does not share a border with Balochistan and nor enjoy good relations with countries bordering it. Thus, India can express its official support but is not in a position to offer military support. Voicing support to Balochistan can thus only put a further strain on Indo-Pakistani relations. ?
· Bugti's succession is made difficult by the fact that he never had the courage to go to the jirga and acknowledge his grandson as heir. He feared that the sub-tribes would stop supporting him.?
· The BLA does not have the resources and consequently the capability. It cannot sustain a full fledged insurgency like in Waziristan and Afghanistan. ?
· The role of the Pakistani Army in Bugti's death is still unclear. The fact that there were only 15 to 20 people at Bugti's burial and no one from his family was present points to a possible foul play. ?
· Musharraf did not distance himself from the killing when he repeated that "the writ of the State is supreme?"
Final Remarks
C Rajamohan
· The Pakistani Army has failed to furnish a credible story and has been changing its statements. However Bugti's death may well succeed in uniting the Balochi.?
· President Musharraf's support base seems to be shrinking as was apparent from the fact that he is the only one from the establishment speaking about Bugti's death. Pakistan might be in danger of entering a new phase of dictatorship.?
· The developments in Balochistan should also be analyzed from a wider perspective. India never had clear borders as a nation-state and dealing with the population living beyond the Indus was always problematic. The British included the tribes within the boundaries of their colony in the subcontinent. Subsequently, Pakistan adopted the same borders. In reality however, no real authority has been exercised over these territories for centuries.?
· The situation in the tribal areas of Pakistan is not very different from that in India's north east. There is a need to modernize and develop the tribal areas in Pakistan. ?
· India will be awarded with new opportunities if the pot keeps boiling in Balochistan. A pertinent question is whether this is an appropriate moment for India to get a favorable agreement on Kashmir if President Musharraf is tactically weakened.
(Prof. Kalim Bahadur is a former Professor of Jawaharlal Nehru University. Dr. D Suba Chandran is Assistant Director at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Dr. C Rajamohan is Strategic Affairs Editor of The Indian Express.)
C Rajamohan
Significant developments have taken place in Pakistan in the past few weeks. However, India needs to be extremely cautious and objective while assessing these developments. The death of Akbar Khan Bugti is an important event for the opposition parties in Pakistan. But it is still unclear whether this will serve as ammunition in their hands. Even the PML-Q headed by Shujaat Husain, which is supposed to be a supporter of the central government, has expressed regret on Bugti's death.
Kalim Bahadur
Akbar Bugti possessed a complex and contradictory personality. He was a typical feudal lord having an authoritarian and criminal bent of mind. He became the Governor of Balochistan in 1973 and helped Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to suppress the insurgency and was the only tribal warlord to do so. He never spoke about separatism. He had supported Baloch accession to Pakistan in 1948 unlike other tribal Sardars who had opposed it. Therefore, his importance for Pakistan should have been greater. The year 1948 marked the beginning of Baloch alienation. The first insurgency took place in the same year. Three more insurgencies took place thereafter in 1958, 1963 and 1973.
In 1973, Bhutto decided to abolish the Sardari system. He introduced limited industrialization and education that gave birth to a new working class as well as a section of radicals. This period also strengthened the growing nationalist movement in Balochistan.
Many contradictions characterize Balochistan. It is a tribal society led by Sardars. Women possess no rights amidst a simultaneous growth of a radical movement. Neither Bhutto nor the Sardars ever initiated serious measures to overcome backwardness in the region. The rate of literacy in Balochistan is 24 percent as compared to 36 percent in Pakistan. Balochistan also has the highest child mortality rate.
The discovery of Sui gas in the late 1950s exposed the rich natural resource base of Balochistan. However, the region has not reaped all the benefits accruing to it from its resources. For example, Quetta is the only beneficiary of the gas from Sui. Moreover, only five percent of people have piped water in Balochistan. There are no Baloch soldiers or officers in the Baloch regiment and only 90 out of 12,000 coast guards are from Balochistan.
Military regimes are largely centralized systems. As a result, all Baloch problems are discussed and resolved in Islamabad. People in Balochistan are wary of mega projects initiated by Pakistan as they fear these projects may result in unemployment, underemployment and turn the local population into a minority. For example, the Baloch are against the functioning of the Gwadar port that employs large umber of Chinese nationals. They also demand an abolition of the Concurrent list. There is a government in Balochistan but elections are rigged and it has no power. This has instigated the Marris, Bugtis and Mengals (the three main tribes in Balochistan) to protest against the discriminatory policies of the government.
Bugti received 12 million rupees from the Centre as royalty for Sui gas and one million rupees as transportation charges. Many are of the opinion that Bugti was running a 'self serving' movement in Balochistan, in order to get more royalty on Sui. The Military regime did not consider it important to fulfill the demands of a small province like Balochistan and saw Bugti as representing the vested interests of a small minority group. This was the main reason for killing him.
D Suba Chandran
Bugti's killing has not yet become a political disaster. It was a military initiative with no involvement of the political elite. Musharraf has won the 'battle' but the 'war' against Baloch nationalism is far from over. Also, without external support, Baloch nationalist movement will not succeed.
Firstly, circumstances prevailing prior to Bugti's killing need to be closely examined. The sub tribes of the Bugtis namely Kalpars and Masuris have been traditional opponents of Akbar Bugti. The military regime purposely pushed the Kalpars back to Dera Bugti and Sui areas, while Musharraf tried to side with the Kalpars on their claim over Sui and the royalty accruing from it in order to weaken Akbar Bugti's position.?????????? Moreover, there were series of surrenders by Marri and Bugti tribesmen and Musharraf ensured that no political vacuum prevailed before the killing of Bugti. Two days before the killing, a tribal jirga comprising of most of the sub tribes was held that decided to confiscate Bugti's property. The jirga agreed on the prevalence of Pakistani Law and abolition of the Sardari system.
Sui is highly important to Pakistan due to its rich gas reserves, royalty and supplies. Therefore, killing of Bugti aimed at teaching him a lesson for trying to gain more benefits from the area.
Secondly, the future of the Baloch nationalist movement is unclear. Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, and Nawab Khair Bux Marri had their own differences that resulted in numerous egoistic clashes. With the killing of Bugti, the question is who will represent him? There is an intra family clash among the Bugtis over the new Sardar's position. The alliance of the heads of three tribes against the centre is in trouble. However, another view is that by killing Bugti, Musharraf has made him a national 'hero.'
Thirdly, the Balochistan Liberation Army or BLA does not have the capability to fight a long waged war against the army or carry out guerilla warfare. It remains a Marri militia and the involvement of Bugtis and Mengals is limited. The role of the middle class and the Baloch Diaspora in the BLA has to be analyzed in greater depth. It is doubtful if the BLA will become a potent force to reckon with, given its inherent weakness and strength of Pakistan's 'lethal' armed forces.
So far, it is a military initiative and not a 'national disaster' and the opposition has not been able to mobilize or push for the no-confidence motion. Even the PML-Q has not split. The MMA will decide whether it wants to continue its membership in the Baloch Legislative Assembly. Thus, Bugti's killing has not become a rallying point for the political parties. Only some border districts of Sindh and Karachi have witnessed violence and protests while other districts are peaceful. The killing of Bugti is more a mistake than a disaster.
Many believe that US has vested interests in the region because of the Chinese presence and interest in Gwadar. It is important to bear in mind that neither the Baloch nationalist movement nor the Baloch armed movement will succeed until they get proactive external support.
C Rajamohan
In Pakistan, the common view is that Balochistan is receiving external support from India. However, the US, Chinese and Iranian interests too play a crucial role given the geopolitics of the region. Therefore, the implications of Bugti's killing for India need to be analyzed comprehensively.
Comments
· Three questions come to mind concerning foreign influence in Balochistan: (a) did the United States support the killing of Akbar Bugti? (b) Is it not too late for them to show an interest in Gwadar and do they want to control the area? (c) Will Pakistan step-up its operation in Kashmir in reaction to India's official declaration of support to Balochistan??
· The media is exaggerating the situation in Balochistan by portraying Bugti as a martyr and comparing the crisis in the region to the alienation of East Pakistan in the 1960s. We should focus on the situation in India itself, rather than exaggerate the Balochistan case.?
· Though Akbar Bugti had been trying to rally the Balochis around him and had held most of the important posts in Pakistan; he was regarded with suspicion. His death could unite the Balochis in a way that he could not achieve while he was alive. The threat that he represented to other leaders will no longer be there after his death. There was a general strike in Balochistan immediately after the death of Bugti. Therefore it would be incorrect to say that Bugti's death had no effect on events in Balochistan. ?
· The question of foreign assistance to Balochistan is an important issue to be examined. Gwadar is completed and has the potential to become a new Dubai. However this can only happen if it is connected to the hinterland. China intends to build pipelines and roads from Gilgit to Gwadar. The US thus has a vested interest in making it impossible for China to gain access to Gwadar. ?
· Can the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) sustain the insurgency in Balochistan in the same manner as in Iraq or Afghanistan? Does it have the resources and wherewithal to fight? ?
· According to the reports originating from Pakistan, the Pakistani establishment is trying hard to make the whole affair appear as an individual action against Balochistan by Musharraf and not as an attack from the Pakistani federal state. ?
· The US realizes that Musharraf is a very dependable ally. However, it is highly debatable whether Russia would be prepared to fight off Gwadar by supporting the Balochi struggle and risk antagonizing Iran with which it has good relations. ?
· The Indian focus has shifted from Punjab to Balochistan in Pakistan. But India's support to the Balochi cause is questionable. A distinction should be made between supporting democratic movements and supporting violent movements.?
· The Pakistani army has evaded responsibilities in the aftermath of Bugti's killing. According to a Bugti tribe guide, Akbar Bugti died due to the collapse of the cave he was living in and not due to any military action. Initially the Army bragged about killing him but later distanced itself from Bugti's killing fearing a backlash.
Responses
Kalim Bahadur
· India is and should support the Balochi cause because it is in India's interest to do so. The Indian statement supporting the establishment of democracy in Balochistan should be viewed in this light. ?
· Gwadar is a Chinese project in a strategic and vital location. Balochistan gives access to Central Asia and Afghanistan, with the possibility of pipelines between these regions and the Indian Ocean. Therefore it is not surprising that India, the US and Russia are also extremely interested in Gwadar.
D Suba Chandran
· A comparison between Balochistan and East Pakistan is irrelevant not only because the two regions are extremely different (For example, Balochistan is a tribal land) but also because no country can currently provide such a large-scale support to Balochistan as India did to East Pakistan in the 1960s.?
· Indian interests in Balochistan are limited by the fact that it does not share a border with Balochistan and nor enjoy good relations with countries bordering it. Thus, India can express its official support but is not in a position to offer military support. Voicing support to Balochistan can thus only put a further strain on Indo-Pakistani relations. ?
· Bugti's succession is made difficult by the fact that he never had the courage to go to the jirga and acknowledge his grandson as heir. He feared that the sub-tribes would stop supporting him.?
· The BLA does not have the resources and consequently the capability. It cannot sustain a full fledged insurgency like in Waziristan and Afghanistan. ?
· The role of the Pakistani Army in Bugti's death is still unclear. The fact that there were only 15 to 20 people at Bugti's burial and no one from his family was present points to a possible foul play. ?
· Musharraf did not distance himself from the killing when he repeated that "the writ of the State is supreme?"
Final Remarks
C Rajamohan
· The Pakistani Army has failed to furnish a credible story and has been changing its statements. However Bugti's death may well succeed in uniting the Balochi.?
· President Musharraf's support base seems to be shrinking as was apparent from the fact that he is the only one from the establishment speaking about Bugti's death. Pakistan might be in danger of entering a new phase of dictatorship.?
· The developments in Balochistan should also be analyzed from a wider perspective. India never had clear borders as a nation-state and dealing with the population living beyond the Indus was always problematic. The British included the tribes within the boundaries of their colony in the subcontinent. Subsequently, Pakistan adopted the same borders. In reality however, no real authority has been exercised over these territories for centuries.?
· The situation in the tribal areas of Pakistan is not very different from that in India's north east. There is a need to modernize and develop the tribal areas in Pakistan. ?
· India will be awarded with new opportunities if the pot keeps boiling in Balochistan. A pertinent question is whether this is an appropriate moment for India to get a favorable agreement on Kashmir if President Musharraf is tactically weakened.
(Prof. Kalim Bahadur is a former Professor of Jawaharlal Nehru University. Dr. D Suba Chandran is Assistant Director at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. Dr. C Rajamohan is Strategic Affairs Editor of The Indian Express.)
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