Contemporary Islamic Movements and Thought The Editors' Introduction

Written by Komaruddin Hidayat and Ahmad Gaus, AF

Throughout Indonesia’s history as an independent nation, Islam and the state have struggled with each other as separate, competing entities.1 This struggle reached one of its peaks during the Constitutional Assembly’s Sessions (1956-1959), when Islamic groups took a stance opposed to that of secular nationalists. The Islamic groups fought for Islam to serve as the country’s foundation, while the secular nationalists insisted on Pancasila philosophy [ed. note: belief in one God; a just and civilized humanity; national unity; democracy and social justice] instead. As both groups clung fiercely to their own arguments and opinions, the Constitutional Assembly found itself at a deadlock, unable to resolve the problem. This in turn led President Sukarno to take charge of the Assembly’s agenda and to issue the famous Presidential Decree, which returned the country to the 1945 Constitution.
This story has become a classic, and perhaps too traumatic to ever repeat. But the fact that the problem was unresolved is exactly why it has remained stored in the vault of history, with the opposing arguments passed on from generation to generation. Each succeeding generation has always been tempted to reopen the old history vault and rehash the Constitutional Assembly’s debate transcripts, page after page.
Since the Constitutional Assembly, the problem concerning the relationship between Islam and the state has grown more ideological and political, overshadowing the academic discourses that were so productive in the nineteen-fifties.2 Indeed, the debate about the relationship between Islam and the state has assumed an academic form since the early days, such as the nineteen-thirties debate between Soekarno and Mohammad Natsir.3 The political struggle to actualize the idea of an Islamic state did not occur until the Constitutional Assembly’s Conference, where Islam suffered the above-mentioned “defeat.” But this precedent had a lasting, negative impact on the relationship between the state and Islam, which has carried over to subsequent periods.
As Islam’s leverage as a political force declined, Masyumi leaders – who had been militant supporters of the Islamic state during the Constitutional Assembly’s Sessions – were imprisoned without trial by the Soekarno Regime.4 Masyumi was then disbanded in the late sixties on the grounds that some of its main leaders (e.g. Mohammad Natsir and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara) were involved in the PRRI rebellion. When the Soekarno regime fell and these leaders were released from prison, intending to revive Masyumi, the Soeharto regime did not permit it.5 As a substitute, Soeharto allowed the formation of a new party to represent the Islamic community, which was later named Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, or the Indonesian Muslims Party—founded in 1968). As it turned out, the Soeharto Regime was motivated not by good will towards the Islamic community, but because Suharto felt it would be easier to control Islam as a political force through this rump party.
In the 1971 Elections, Parmusi received only 5.3% of the votes as the “heir” of Masyumi, while Golkar – the political machine of the Soeharto regime, or the “New Order” – won 62.8% of the votes.6 From this election result, it is clear that Islam as a political force had faded in Indonesia. The New Order Regime did not treat political Islam any better than had the previous Soekarno regime. In fact, the antagonism worsened, due to Soeharto’s government policies in the seventies and early eighties.7
This antagonism brought about a crisis, as evidenced by the worsening relationship between Islam and the state. The Tanjung Priok incident8 was one of several “uncontainable explosions” that characterized the mounting crisis. The mid-eighties also witnessed other incidents, like the bombing of the ancient Buddhist temple of Borobudur in Central Java and the bombing of Bank Central Asia (BCA) in Jakarta, by Islamic groups.
Not all Islamic forces were drawn into conflict with the ruling regime, from the Old Order under Soekarno to the New Order under Soeharto. Outside the political mainstream and commotion that struggled to establish an Islamic order from the fifties to the eighties, a different tide arose bearing other voices. These voices represent a Hegelian synthesis in the dialectical clash that occurred between Islamic groups and the ruling regime. They were born in the form of socio-cultural and intellectual movements.
The socio-cultural movements in question were the Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and the Muhammadiyah – the world’s largest and second-largest mass Muslim organizations. NU was actually one of the Islamic groups that struggled for Islam to serve as the country’s foundation during the 1956-1959 Constitutional Assembly’s Sessions. But when the Soekarno regime issued its decree mandating a return to the 1945 Constitution, the NU easily accepted this decision, while other Islamic groups did not. When the Soeharto regime established Pancasila as the only foundation for political and religious organizations in 1983/84, the NU readily accepted this decision as well. The NU proved itself to be highly flexible in confronting various political situations.9 Despite accusations of its being opportunistic—due to this flexible stance—the NU remains to this day the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia, with the largest number of followers (nearly 40 million).
Muhammdiyah – which withdrew earlier from the practical political arena (in 1971, vs. the NU in 1984), was also in the ranks of what came to be known as the Islamic cultural movement. Its advocates believed that Islamization should occur in the form of culturalization, not politization. They also believed that any Islamic movement should be more of a cultural rather than political movement. This kind of attitude emerging from the Muhammadiyah—and also the NU—“represents a more substantial understanding of the relationship between Islam and politics, or between Islam and the state in Indonesia.”10
Beside the NU and Muhammadiyah, there also appeared voices from intellectual movements attempting to find “a solution to the disharmony between Islam and the state.”11 These intellectual movements offered alternative thoughts about the Islam-state relationship, which differed from those of preceding Muslim activists. Led by Nurcholish Madjid, who was the General Chairman of PB HMI [the central headquarters of the Muhhamadiyah Youth Organization], these intellectual movements called for a renewal of Islamic thought and a rejuvenation of religious understanding.
Their calls broke through the stiff relationship between Islam and the state, but also incited controversy among the Islamic community—a risk that they must have anticipated. The revolutionary power and controversial nature of this movement was evident in the ideas they expressed, such as “Islam Yes, Islamic Party No”; the need for secularization and liberalization; and their sharp criticism of the idea of an Islamic state, which they called a mere apology.12 What they aimed to accomplish was to emerge from the old paradigms and thought patterns concerning the relationship between Islam and the state, and to offer a viewpoint different from that of mainstream thought.
Nurcholish Madjid, the “locomotive” behind these intellectual movements, regarded the Islamic state as an apologetic tendency of Muslims when confronted by modern Western ideologies such as democracy, socialism, communism and others. This apology in the face of modern ideologies led to an ideological-political appreciation of Islam, which in turn led to a desire for an “Islamic State,” comparable to democratic states, socialist states, communist states, etc.15 Nurcholish believed that this apology was a form of psychological and emotional compensation for Muslims’ low self-esteem in facing a modern life dominated by Western lifestyles. Through a totalitarian idealization of Islam, Islamist activists wished to prove that Islam was superior, or at least on a par with Western civilization and its modern ideologies in the realm of economics, politics, social life, etc.—i.e., fields where the Islamic community had suffered total defeat.
In light of this analysis, Nurcholish pointed out that the Islamist apology would not prove effective in the long run. After lending the Islamic community temporary satisfaction and self-esteem, he wrote, “These ideas would turn out to be false in the end, and come back as a boomerang to strike the Islamic community.”14 Nurcholish’s criticisms of the idea of an “Islamic State” shifted the mainstream Islamic paradigm, and also gave a sense of theological security to Muslims, in that they could remain good Muslims without having to establish an Islamic State or become a member of an Islamic Party.
This paradigm shift is readily evident in the fact that from the post-Independence era (Soekarno’s regime) to early New Order (Soeharto’s regime), the political formulas used by Islamic activists constantly clashed with other groups, i.e., nationalists and non-Muslims. The intellectual movements established by Nurcholish and his friends, on the other hand, attempted to “formulize a nationally acceptable relationship between Islam and the state.”15 This was carried out by reducing the legalistic-formalistic tendencies that Nurcholish observed had become so acute among the Islamic community, which he called “fiqihism.” [“obsession with Islamic law”]16
Insofar as bridging the gap between Islamic groups and nationalist groups (most of whom actually came from the Islamic community, but rejected the idea of an Islamic State), Nurcholish and friends were relatively successful. The question then emerged as to how to put these ideas and discourses into political action, so as not to remain a mere intellectual discourse or awareness. The actions of Islamic political activists from Nurcholish’s generation have demonstrated how these ideas might work in practice. The clearest example of this can be seen in the career of Akbar Tandjung. The former General Chairman of PB HMI [the Muhammadiyah’s youth wing] joined Golkar [Soeharto’s political party], which was clearly not an Islamic party. Akbar took this controversial step—his Islamic colleagues had wanted him to join an Islamic party—not without reason. In his own words:
Nurcholish’s “liberal” ideas have of course inspired HMI activists to enter the political arena. Nurcholish believes that we should fight for universal values, instead of Islamic symbols. So I believe that to fight for these values on a practical level, one does not necessarily have to be a member of an Islamic Party. I believe that the Islamic people’s aspirations can be fulfilled without Islamic parties.17
Akbar represents a new generation of political Islam that was formed by the Islamic thought renewal movement a la Nurcholish Madjid—something that had been unimaginable until then.
Meanwhile, on the level of governmental bureaucracy, Nurcholish Madjid’s ideas were given form and substance by figures like Munawir Sjadzali.18 Munawir served as the Minister of Religion for two back-to-back terms (1983-1993). His ideas about the reactualization of Islamic teachings helped give direction to the intellectual movements that had emerged since the nineteen seventies. This has placed him as one of the key and most influential figures of Islamic thought renewal in Indonesia.19 Similar to renewal discourses in the seventies, Munawir Sjadzali’s thoughts revolved around the concept of the Islamic State. His views were in line with those of Nurcholish Madjid and Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid, and not unlike those of Syaikh Ali Abd al-Raziq from Egypt, who said that the concept of the Islamic state did not exist, nor did what was called an “Islamic State.”20
Indeed, the roots of Munawir’s thoughts about Islam – as Dawam Rahardjo has observed – revolved around the theories of Islamic state and government. As the Minister of Religion in the New Order, which the Islamic community viewed as an un-Islamic regime, Munawir faced a difficult task of convincing Muslims to accept Pancasila as the country’s foundation and ideology, as well as of their own ideology. He viewed Pancasila as a result of ijtihad (interpretation) that was, at least, in line with the most fundamental of Islamic teachings—a situation similar to the Islamic state and governmental system in the era of Khulafa' al Rasyidin, which was a result of the collective ijtihad of the Islamic community at that time.21
Actually, long before Nurcholish and his friends criticized the idea of the “Islamic State,” Munawir had already written a book called Analyse: Mungkinkah Negara Indonesia Bersendikan Islam? (Analysis: Can the Nation of Indonesia be Based upon Islam?) in the nineteen fifties. At that time he used a pen name, Ibnu Amatillah. Perhaps he did not want to expose himself to personal attacks engendered by his criticism of the concept of an “Islamic State” at a time when the Islamic mainstream was zealously and emotionally supporting the establishment of an “Islamic State.” Munawir’s ideas may be regarded as too advanced for their time.22 In that book, as well as in his other works such as Islam dan Tata Negara (Islam and the State System), Munawir expressed his belief that all historical processes, including the succession of power from the Prophet to Abu Bakar, Umar, Utsman and Ali (the Prophet’s companions), were simply the result of human initiative and ijtihad. There were no instructions from the Prophet, let alone from God, about how a polity should be created. In other words, political issues have always been a fully rational issue.23
Certainly, during the nineteen fifties through the eighties – when Islam and the Indonesian state struggled intensively – we never heard of the term or the idea of civil society. But during the nineteen seventies, various socio-cultural groups (especially the NU and Muhammadiyah) and Islamic intellectual movements a la Munawir, Nurcholish and friends actually created a socio-cultural movement to build civil society from the ground up. Had the concept of civil society been as widely developed and understood at that time as it is today, it would have added much color to the dialectic and struggle between Islam and the state.
Today, clearly fewer Indonesians speak about the Islamic State. But the occasional maneuvers that demand a return to the Jakarta Charter or the national adoption of Islamic Shari’a, are a continuation of the idea of the Islamic State. It massively resurfaced, for example, during an MPR [national legislative session] session in 2000, when Islamic groups like FPI, KISDI, KAMMI, PII, HAMMAS, DDII, etc. rallied their followers at the DPR/MPR [legislative] building to voice their aspirations. In this case, the forces of Islamic civil society – represented by the NU and Muhammadiyah, and scholars such as Nurcholish Madjid – were among those who rejected the call for an Islamic State.24
The concept of civil society increasingly strengthens and informs Indonesia’s Islamic socio-cultural movements, for they share the same vision. In the concept of civil society, the people are not subordinate to the state, but its equal partner. This is also the case in Islam, especially Sunni Islam, where a religious institution must not force its concepts upon its followers or rule based on the claims or prerogatives of a single group. In Islam, power is civil power, as expressed through a consensus of the people. It is the people themselves who are the source of legitimate power. And therefore, those who possess political power may be toppled or relieved of that power, should the people wish it.25 It is this kind of civil society concept that is endorsed by the various socio-cultural Islamic groups and Islamic intellectual movements a la Nurcholish Madjid, Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid, Munawir Sjadzali, etc.
After Islamic socio-cultural movements like the NU and Muhammadiyah withdrew from practical politics, they began to focus their activities on reinforcing civil society. Muslim youths – both belonging to groups affiliated to these two Islamic mass organizations, or to independent ones – are not thinking about the “Islamic State” anymore, either. They tend to spend more of their thought and energy on empowering civil society, by introducing progressive discourses, enhancing democracy and civil freedom, advocating issues such as gender and citizen rights, publishing, training, etc.
The essays compiled in this book are largely written by young Muslim who hold such an Islamic vision and orientation. They view their religion through the lens of the future. For example, they respect the legacy and traditions of classical thought, but are not reluctant to criticize it, if they feel that idealization of these classical legacies by certain Islamic groups today is excessive. The ideas of the past were born in response to the needs of their own time. Changing times bring about different needs, and thus a need for new formulations of thoughts and ideas. It is in this area that the contributors to this volume are now delving.
Today many of them are continuing their studies either within or outside Indonesia. Some are NGO activists or professors at universities. Their names are widely familiar to Indonesians because of their activities, their articles in the mass media or in books. As the editors of this volume, we will not describe the thoughts of the young contributors to this book one by one. We will let them speak for themselves about their concerns.
The articles compiled in this book are published as a tribute to the late Munawir Sjadzali, who has left us. Although a large age difference—three generations—separates many of the authors from that of Munawir Sjadzali, his ideas remain close to them, and have even come to form their inspiration and spirit.
Pak Mun—as he was intimately called—died on Friday, July 23, 2004 at Pondok Indah Hospital, Jakarta. He had been treated in the hospital since June 8, 2004, for stroke and complications of several diseases. The late Pak Munawir was known as an educator, diplomat, bureaucrat and thinker. As an educator, he was known for his brilliant ideas for improving Islamic education system and the future quality of Muslim scholars. Islamic professors from leading universities in the West today have not forgotten Munawir Sjadzali’s great deeds, for he was the one who fought to establish those channels of study in the West while he was serving as Indonesia’s Minister of Religion. The Special Programs for Madrasah Aliyah Project (MAPK), which opened in 1988 and later yielded many top-quality young scholars, was also the fruit of his labor.
As a diplomat, Munawir Sjadzali was a polite and well-respected figure in the international world. As a bureaucrat, he was known to be clean and honest—there have never been negative rumors about him during his service as a public official or afterwards. And as a thinker, he did not sit idly by the sidelines, when he witnessed the symptoms of rigid thinking befall the Islamic community. He will be remembered as one of the locomotives of Islamic thought renewal in Indonesia.
Munawir Sjadzali dedicated most of his life to the public welfare through his many careers, which he executed with hard work and no nonsense. Indeed, he conveyed his deep and “establishment-challenging” thoughts clearly and calmly, almost without ambition or fiery provocation. When in the nineteen eighties, for example, he voiced the need for the reinterpretation of Islamic law – concerning inheritance, bank interest, etc. – he was actually calling for scientific discussions of a kind that have long since disappeared from the Islamic intellectual mainstream.
A harsh polemic emerged when he voiced his reinterpretation ideas once again in Paramadina’s KKA forum in the late eighties. Nevertheless, he was not viewed as a controversial person seeking popularity.
This was because his opinions were actually on many people’s minds; only they were reluctant to express their thoughts because the reinterpretation of Islamic law was considered a sensitive issue. Undeterred by such considerations – because he considered it to be a real problem that Muslims faced every day – Munawir was convinced that the issue of reinterpretation must be openly addressed.
Now Munawir Sjadzali has passed on. But his legacy – the inspiration to delve into the essence of Islamic teachings – will always live on. To remember Munawir is to remember his spirit in capturing the dynamics of Islamic teachings, which he believed were flexible and could follow the turning wheels of time, as long as its adherents were able to correctly understand the spirit of the Qur’an.
This book aims to remember, and to eulogize, the figure, spirit, struggles and thoughts of Prof. Dr. Munawir Sjadzali, MA. It is hoped that the readers, especially the young generation, can benefit from his lifelong works and devotion.
In closing, we as editors would like to express our deepest gratitude to the family of the late Munawir Sjadzali, who have put their trust in us to compile this book. It would not have been completed without the help of many people, especially the involvement of the authors. For that we also express our appreciation and thanks to the various writers who have contributed their thoughts to this book.
We requested almost all of the articles in this book from the authors. We asked them to write especially about certain themes that we have arranged. However, we included some articles beyond the ones we requested, for their content is significant and should be widely read and known. For these articles, we included information regarding their source at the end of each article.
Of course, not all of the articles in this book are directly related to the figure or thoughts of the late Munawir Sjadzali. Ever since the origin of this project, it has been agreed that this book will address progressive discourses and issues in Islam, especially Islam in Indonesia, and that Pak Mun’s thoughts would be the source of inspiration. That is why the writers we have chosen are those who could be “imaginary students” of the late Munawir Sjadzali, whom we know to have been a progressive thinker.
As for books by and about Pak Mun himself that have been published by the Paramadina Foundation, there was one entitled Kontekstualisasi Ajaran Islam: 70 Tahun Prof. Dr. H. Munawir Sjadzi, MA. (The Contextualization of Islamic Teachings: 70 Years Prof Dr. H. Munawir Sjadzi, MA.) published in 1995 in association with IPHI (Ikatan Persaudaraan Haji Indonesia). Following that, in 1997 Paramadina published a small book by Pak Munawir entitled Ijtihad Kemanusiaan (Humanistic Interpretation). As such, this is his third book published by Paramadina. We hope this volume will benefit us all, and happy reading.

Endnotes
1 The relationship between the two is described as “a story of antagonism and distrust by both sides.” See, for example, Bahtiar Effendy, Islam dan Negara; Transforamasi Pemikiran dan Praktik Politik Islam di Indonesia (Jakarta; Paramadina, 1998), p. 60. Of course it should be noted that the relational problem between Islam and the state has also been a concern of Islamic movements all over the world, not only in Indonesia. See, for example, Abdurrahman Wahid, Mengurai Hubungan Agama dan Negara (Jakarta; Grasindo, 1999), p. 63.
2 In the fifties, many books were published on the theme of the relationship between Islam and the State, among others: Mukthar Yahya, Islam Dan Negara, Padang Pandjang, Poestaka Sa’adijah, 1946; H.S. Fachruddin, Politik dan Islam, Medan, 1951; Abu Hanifah, Soal Agama dalam Negara Modern, Djakarta, 1949; Muhammad Saleh Suaidy, Persoalan Negara Islam, Djakarta: Perbaikan, 1953; Zainal Abidin Ahmad, Membentuk Negara Islam, Djakarta: Widjaya, 1956; M. Hasbi Ash Shiddieqy, Dasar-Dasar Pemerintahan Islam, Medan, 1950; Zainal Abidin Ahmad, Islam dan Parlementarisme, Bandung, Indonesia: Aliran Islam, 1950; Mohammad Iqbal dan M. Natsir, Dapatkah Dipisahkan Politik dari Agama? Djakarta: Mutiara, 1954; Khalifa Abdul Hakim dan Syarif Usman, Konsepsi Asasi Tatanegara Islam: Ditambah Dengan Pendapat Alim Ulama Seluruh Pakistan dan Pendapat Alim Ulama Seluruh Indonesia, Djakarta: Fa. Sudjas, 1953; Ibnu Amatillah, M. Sj., Mungkinkah Negara Indonesia Bersendikan Islam: Analyse, Tjet. 1. ed. Semarang: Usaha Taruna, 1950. For further information, read also Luthfi Assyaukanie’s article in this book.
3 The Natsir vs. Soekarno polemic was recorded, in part, in the writings, Arti Agama dalam Negara; Mungkinkah Quran Mengatur Negara; Islam “Demokrasi?” etc. See Mohammad Natsir, Capita Selecta (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1973). Soekarno himself had already written many articles about Islam, one of which incited this polemic, viz., Apa Sebab Turki Memisahkan Agama dari Negara? (Why Has Turkey Separated Religion and State?), published in Panji Islam magazine, 1938.
4 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, “Dialog Dua Generasi”, introduction in Tidak Ada Negara Islam: Surat-Surat Politik Nurcholish Madjid—Mohamad Roem (Jakarta: Penerbit Djambatan, 1997), p. xi.
5 Ahmad Syafii Maarif, ibid.
6 R. William Liddle, Pemilu-Pemilu Orde Baru: Pasang Surut Kekuasaan Politik (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1992), p. 10. Other Islamic parties also received little support, like PSII (2.39%), Perti (0.70%), while NU was politically moderate (18.67%). The utter defeat of these Islamic parties, according to Harold Crouch, was because the New Order regime had succeeded in creating “an unfavorable condition for political parties” (quoted from Bahtiar Effendy, Islam dan Negara, p. 116).
7 Among these policies were: permitting gambling to increase revenue for the city of Jakarta’s local government; the 1973 bill of marriage; the government’s suggestion in 1978 legislative session to upgrade the status of traditional beliefs to recognize these as a religion, like Islam; and the adoption of Pancasila as the only foundation for all sociopolitical forces, which for the Islamic community meant that they had to replace Islam with Pancasila as their political party’s or socio-cultural movement’s foundation.
8 The Tanjung Priok Incident, which occurred on September 12, 1984, was incited by the Islamic community’s feeling offended by military thugs, who entered a mosque in a densely-populated area without taking off their shoes and then poured ditch water on the walls. These actions angered Islamic activists, who subsequently launched a major demonstration, which was met by the police with gunfire. This tragedy took the lives of 63 Muslims, left 100 badly wounded, and 171 disappeared.
9 Such an approach is not without religious basis. Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid has explained that it follows a fiqh rule that says, ma la yudraku kulluh la yutraku julluh, which means “That which cannot be gained fully is not to be omitted completely.” As a whole, he said, of course Muslims initially hoped for a formal adoption of the Islamic State, but with the birth of the Indonesian Republic, we must accept the most important thing in it, which is the existence of a country that allows Muslims to follow and express their religious teachings. (See Mengurai Hubungan Agama dan Negara, p. 341).
10 M. Din Syamsuddin, Islam dan Politik Era Orde Baru (Jakarta: Logos, 2001), p. 156.
11 Bahtiar Effendy, Islam dan Negara, p. 126.
12 See Nurcholish Madjid’s paper, “Keharusan Pembaharuan Pemikiran Islam dan Masalah Integrasi Umat” and “Menyegarkan Paham Keagamaan di Kalangan Umat Islam Indonesia”, republished in Charles Kurzman (ed.), Wacana Islam Liberal: Pemikiran Islam Kontemporer tentang Isu-Isu Global (Jakarta: Paramadina, 2001), p. 484-503
13 Ibid., p. 501.
14 Ibid., p. 502.
15 Bahtiar Effendy, “Islam dan Negara di Indonesia: Munawir Sjadzali dan Pengembangan Dasar-Dasar Teologi Baru Politik Islam", in Kontekstualisasi Ajaran Islam, 70 Tahun Prof. Dr. H. Munawir Sjadzali, MA (Jakarta; Paramadina and IPHI, 1995), p. 404.
16 See “Menyegarkan Paham Keagamaan di Kalangan Umat Islam Indonesia”, republished in Charles Kurzman (ed.), Wacana Islam Liberal: Pemikiran Islam Kontemporer tentang Isu-Isu Global (Jakarta, Paramadina, 2001), p. 503).
17 M. Deden Ridwan and M. Muhajirin, Membangun Konsensus: Pemikiran dan Praktek Politik Akbar Tandjung (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 2003), p. 127.
18 Bahtiar Effendy, “Islam dan Negara di Indonesia: Munawir Sjadzali dan Pengembangan Dasar-Dasar Teologi Baru Politik Islam,” in Kontekstualisasi Ajaran Islam, 70 Tahun Prof. Dr. H. Munawir Sjadzali, MA (Jakarta; Paramadina and IPHI, 1995), p. 410.
19 See M. Dawam Rahardjo’s article in the preface to this book.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 See Luthfi Assyaukanie’s article in this book.
23 Ibid.
24 See, “Tiga Tokoh Islam Tolak Piagam Jakarta”, Republika, August 11, 2000, republished in Kurniawan Zein and Saripudin HA, Ed., Syariat Islam Yes, Syariat Islam No: Dilema Piagam Jakarta dalam Amandemen UUD 1945 (Jakarta; Paramadina, 2001), p. 203.
25 Fahmi Huwaydi, Demokrasi, Oposisi, dan Masyarakat Madani, translated (Bandung: Mizan, 1996), p. 197-198.
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Komaruddin Hidayat, Prof. Ph.D., Professor of Islamic Philosophy at Universitas Islam Negeri (UIN/State Islamic University) Syarif Hidayatullah Jakarta. He earned his doctorate in philosophy from the Middle East University in Ankara, Turkey. In 1997 Dr. Hidayat was appointed Executive Director of Paramadina Foundation, then as the Executive Director of Madania Education Institution. He is currently a member of Paramadina Foundation’s Board of Patrons. A former reporter for Panjimas magazine, Dr. Hidayat is a prolific author whose writings often appear in numerous leading national newspapers and magazines such as Kompas, Republika, Koran Tempo, Suara Karya, Majalah Tempo, Gatra, Forum, and many others. His published works include Memahami Bahasa Agama (Understanding the Language of Religion; Paramadina, 1996), Agama Masa Depan (Religion of the Future; Paramadina, 1996), Tragedi Raja Midas (The Tragedy of King Midas; Paramadina, 1999), Fikih Lintas Agama [co-author] (Interreligious Jurisprudence; Paramadina, 2003). He was previously the Director of Perguruan Tinggi Agama Islam (Islamic Tertiary Education) at the Indonesian government’s Department of Religion. During the 2004 Elections, he was the head of Central Panwaslu (Panitia Pengawas Pemilu, the Elections Observer Committee). He is currently the Dean of the Graduate School at the Islamic State University, Jakarta.
Ahmad Gaus AF, is Libforall Foundation’s Director of Publications, where he is responsible for translating the best work of progressive Indonesian Muslims into Arabic and English. Chief Editor at Paramadina Publishing from 1999-2005, Mr. Gaus is an alumnus of the Communications Department at Institut Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik (IISIP/Institute for Social and Political Science) in Jakarta, Indonesia. He studied religion at Pondok Pesantren (Islamic boarding school) Daar el-Qolam under the tutelage of Dr. Kyai Haji Ahmad Rifai Arief. While in college, Mr. Gaus was a member of Gerakan Mahasiswa Nasional Indonesia (GMNI/Indonesian National Studients’ Movement in Greater Jakarta) Jakarta Raya, and a visiting student at several religious schools (pesantren salafiyah, affiliated with the Nahdlatul Ulama). In 1998, together with several intellectuals and activists, Mr. Gaus founded the Indonesian Institute for Civil Society (INCIS), an NGO that promotes advocacy and empowerment in the field of social politics. He was INCIS’s Program Officer in a study of “ethnic conflicts,” performed in collaboration with LP3ES-OTI. He was also an associate researcher at P3M under Kyai Haji Masdar F. Mas’udi.
Mr. Gaus’s career as a writer began in middle school, when he contributed to the teenage, education and culture sections of many Sunday newspapers. His articles, columns, features and book reviews have been published in newspapers and magazines including: Kompas, Media Indonesia, Republika, Suara Karya, Majalah Gatra, MATRA, GAMMA, Panjimas, Petra Journal, Kultur Journal, etc. He is the co-author of Fikih Lintas Agama (Interreligious Jurisprudence: Paramadina, 2003), edited several anthologies by Nurcholish Madjid, such as Atas Nama Pengalaman: Beragama dan Berbangsa di Masa Transisi (In the Name of Experience: Practicing Religion and Nationhood in a Time of Transition; Paramadina, 2002), Dialog Ramadlan Bersama Cak Nur (Ramadan Dialog with Cak Nur; Paramadina, 2000), Kaki Langit Peradaban Islam (Horizons of Islamic Culture; Paramadina, 1997), Masyarakat Religius (Religious Society; Paramadina, 1997). With Prof. Dr. Komaruddin Hidayat, he edited Passing Over: Melintasi Batas Agama (Passing Over: Crossing the Boundaries of Religion; Gramedia-Paramadina, 1998). He contributed hundreds of entries for Ensiklopedi Islam untuk Pelajar (Islamic Encyclopedia for Students; Jakarta, PT Ichtiar Baru van Hoeve, 2002).
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